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WHY PROTECT PRIVATE ARMS POSSESSION? NINE 
THEORIES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Michael Steven Green* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed."1 Until recently, federal courts adopted a "collective-right" 
interpretation of the Amendment. 2 According to this interpretation, 
the Second Amendment's scope is limited by its prefatory clause: the 
people have a right to bear arms only insofar as it contributes to a 
"well regulated Militia." Furthermore, the term "Militia" refers to 
organized state militias, whose only modern equivalent is the National 
Guard. 
Under the collective-right interpretation, the Second Amend-
ment protects the interests of state governments, not individuals. For 
this reason, only regulations of firearms that impair states' abilities to 
arm their militias can be unconstitutional. 3 No challenged regulation 
has ever come close to this threshold. 
© 2008 Michael Steven Green. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may 
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for 
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to 
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice. 
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale 
University, 1990;J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. I would like to thank an audience at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and especially Matt Adler and Stephen Perry, 
for comments on an earlier incarnation of this paper. Thanks also to Nelson Lund, 
Bill Van Alstyne, Jim Dwyer, Nate Oman, Torben Spaak, and an audience at the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Uppsala, Sweden for helpful comments on more 
recent drafts. 
1 U.S. CaNST. amend. II. 
2 See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1993). As we shall see, the choice 
of the term "collective right" is unfortunate. See infra Part II.A. 
3 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit took the collective-right interpretation to what 
would appear to be its logical conclusion, ruling that individuals have no standing to 
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District of Columbia v. Heller4 changed all that. The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for purposes 
unrelated to state militia service, including personal self-defense, and 
struck down two gun control laws on the ground that they violated this 
individual right.5 The District of Columbia's prohibition on most pri-
vate ownership of handguns was unconstitutional because it banned a 
class of arms that "is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for 
[self-defense] ."6 Its requirement that other firearms be kept disassem-
bled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device that would render 
them incapable of immediate use was struck down because the law 
made it "impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful pur-
pose of self-defense."7 
This Article will not discuss the textual and historical arguments 
Scalia offered in favor of his reading. I will assume that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. At the same 
time, I will not address the normative question of whether the Second 
Amendment would exist in an ideal world-that is, whether individu-
als' interests in arms possession truly merit constitutional protection. 
The method of this Article can best be described as normative reason-
ing under constraint. Assuming that there should be an individual 
constitutional right to bear arms, what are the best normative argu-
ments available in favor of this conclusion? What are the most plausi-
ble individual interests in private arms possession that such a right 
would protect? 
Such an inquiry would not be necessary if Scalia had provided a 
detailed account of these interests himself. To be sure, his opinion is 
challenge federal regulation of firearms on Second Amendment grounds. See Silveira 
v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002). 
4 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The decision in Heller 
was influenced by vigorous academic attacks on the collective-right interpretation 
over the past two decades, sometimes from surprising comers. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1162-73 (1991); Don B. Kates, 
Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MicH. L. 
REv. 204, 214-20 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 
YALE LJ. 637, 643-57 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right 
to Bear Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1996); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amend-
ment and the Personal Right to Anns, 43 DuKE LJ. 1236, 1254 (1994); Eugene Volokh, 
The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 812-13 (1998). 
5 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797-98. 
6 !d. at 2817 (striking down D.C. CooE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)); see also id. at 
2818 (describing the handgun as the "quintessential self-defense weapon"). 
7 !d. at 2818 (striking down D.C. CoDE§ 7-2507.02 (2001)). 
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peppered with references to the "natural"8 or "inherent"9 right of self-
defense. But he does not say why the natural right to self-defense 
exists or how it grounds a right to bear arms. 
Indeed, Scalia fails to answer what is surely the most fundamental 
question about the right to bear arms, namely whether it exists 
because it contributes to our safety. Granted, when I use arms in justi-
fiable self-defense against a violent intruder, that act makes me safer. 
But a system of private arms possession, in which others (including 
the intruder himself) also possess arms, might increase my vulnerabil-
ity to violence. Is Scalia saying that the Founders rejected this possibil-
ity? Was the Second Amendment enacted because a system of private 
arms possession was thought to make citizens safer than one in which 
they were disarmed? Or did they think individuals have some auton-
omy interest in arms possession worth protecting even in the face of 
increased violence? And if the Second Amendment does protect an 
autonomy interest, what is this interest? As we shall see, this matter is 
far more complicated than it might at first appear. 
In this Article, I will seek to identify the most plausible interests in 
private arms possession that might stand behind the Second Amend-
ment, even if these interests would not justify the decision in Heller. 
For example, one possible justification for the Second Amendment is 
that it protects our democratic institutions by empowering citizens to 
rebel by force of arms against a tyrannical minority. Although this 
justification can explain why individuals, and not merely states, have 
Second Amendment rights, it fails to explain the result in Heller, since 
it gives us no reason to believe that individuals have constitutionally 
protected interests in the use of arms in self-defense against private 
violence .1 0 
I will concentrate, however, on interests that could justify the Hel-
ler decision. Indeed, an ideal account would justify, not merely the 
result in Heller, but the other claims that Scalia made, in dicta, about 
the scope of the Second Amendment. Most significantly, he argued 
that individuals have a constitutionally protected interest only in bear-
ing arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
8 /d. at 2838 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139); id. at 2809 
(quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)); see also id. at 2805 (quoting ST. 
GEORGE TucKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE's CoMMEN-
TARIES app. at 300 (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Busch Young & Abraham 
Small 1803) ("[T]he right to self-defense is the first law of nature.")). 
9 !d. at 2817. 
10 See infra Part Il.A. 
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poses," 11 a principle that would exclude "dangerous and unusual 
weapons" such as machine guns. 12 The closest I will come to such an 
ideal account is the argument that the Second Amendment protects 
bearing arms in self-defense, not as a means of making us safer from 
violence, but out of respect for Lockean values of autonomy and 
individualism. 
Once again, I offer these arguments not as a defender of the Sec-
ond Amendment, but rather as a defender of principled reasoning 
about questions of constitutional law. Sensitivity to the variety of pos-
sible interests protected by the Second Amendment is essential to any 
intellectually responsible discussion of the topic. This is true even if 
one seeks solely to discern the Founders' intent. Unless one is aware 
of all the reasons they may have thought private arms possession was 
worthy of constitutional protection, one stands the chance of over-
looking their actual reasons. 
Clarity about the Second Amendment's purposes is particularly 
important when deciding questions of scope unanswered by Heller. 
Consider, for example, the appropriate standard of review for laws 
that infringe upon protected Second Amendment interests-a matter 
that Scalia left open in his opinion. 13 Should the standard be strict 
scrutiny, 14 which upholds such laws only if they are justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to further 
that interest?15 In free speech contexts, whether strict or intermediate 
scrutiny is chosen depends upon the strength of the interest at issue. 
Laws that burden commercial speech, for example, get intermediate 
scrutiny because the interests standing behind such speech are less 
significant.I6 We cannot figure out which standard of review the Sec-
11 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. He derives this limitation from United States v. Miller, 
307 u.s. 174, 179 (1939). 
12 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
13 See id. at 2817-18. 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
15 See ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 519-20 (2002). Such a standard 
might threaten laws prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms. Scalia 
claimed, in dicta, that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt" on such 
laws. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. But even if one assumes that the considerations of 
public safety that motivate them are compelling, they appear seriously overinclusive, 
since many felonies (such as white-collar crimes) do not suggest a tendency to gun 
violence. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MicH. L. REv. 638, 
721 (2007). 
16 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). Under inter-
mediate scrutiny, a law infringing upon a protected interest is constitutional if it is 
justified by an important governmental interest and is substantially related to that 
interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995). 
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ond Amendment deserves without a theory of the interests it 
protects.17 
Another question of scope left unanswered by Heller is whether 
the Second Amendment should be incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause and applied to the states. Incorpora-
tion has been held to apply only to those provisions in the Bill of 
Rights that are "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."18 
For example, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was held to be 
17 Another possibility is a reasonableness standard of review, similar to that 
applied in Fourth Anlendment contexts. Under the Fourth Anlendment, an invasion 
of privacy can be constitutionally permissible even if it is only roughly tailored to a 
governmemal interest, and even if that interest is something less than compelling, 
provided that the invasion is reasonable-a matter that is determined "by balancing 
[the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Anlendment interests against [the] promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 652-53 (1995); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 
n.9 (1989) ("The reasonableness of any particular government activity does not neces-
sarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." (citing 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983))). 
A reasonableness standard should be distinguished from a rational basis stan-
dard. Under the latter, a law would be upheld if it is a rational means of furthering 
some legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973). The existence of a governmental interest support-
ing the law is all that matters-this interest is not balanced against some 
constitutionally protected interest of the individual. The rational basis test is used in 
Equal Protection cases when the challenged governmental action does not implicate a 
protected class or fundamental right. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
As Scalia notes, a rational basis standard of review for the Second Anlendment would 
provide arms possession with no greater protection than it would have in the absence 
of the Second Anlendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18 n.27. 
The court of appeals in Heller and many Second Anlendment advocates appear to 
adopt a reasonableness standard. They claim, for example, that the right to bear 
arms can be subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public safety. See, e.g., 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398-400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub nom. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); United States v. Emerson, 270 
F.3d 203, 261-65 (5th Cir. 2001); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The 
New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139, 1190 (1986); Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 643,677 (1995) ("[The Second Anlendment] should 
be subject to the same balancing test that has been successfully used in reconciling 
conflicting interests with respect to other amendments."); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Sec-
ond Amendment: A Dialogue, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 145-46; 
Lund, supra note 4, at 49 (explaining that the Second Anlendment requires "balanc-
ing individual liberty against public safety"); Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1253-54. 
But see Winkler, supra note 15, at 691-93 (discussing strict scrutiny language used in 
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), and by some Second Anlend-
ment advocates). 
18 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
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incorporated because it was a "fundamental right"19 that protected 
criminal defendants' interests in a fair and unbiased trial.20 Once 
again, we cannot know whether the Second Amendment deserves the 
same treatment without a theory of the interests it protects. Although 
I will not seek to resolve these important problems of the Second 
Amendment's scope in this Article, the interests in private arms pos-
session that I identify must form the basis of any resolution. 
In his opinion, Scalia did not merely state that individuals have 
an interest in private arms possession. He described them as having a 
natural right to bear arms, a right that preexisted the enactment of 
the Second Amendment.21 This natural right would have limited the 
government's authority even if the Founders had failed to recognize it 
in the Constitution.22 In keeping with Scalia's account, the justifica-
tions I describe will generally seek to explain how the interests individ-
uals have in private arms possession are sufficiently fundamental to 
limit the authority of the government. 
In many cases, these justifications will rely on Lockean arguments 
about the limits of governmental authority.23 For Locke, the source of 
the government's authority is the consent of the governed, and the 
limits of this authority are determined by the scope of that consent. It 
is useful to discuss the Second Amendment in the context of Locke's 
theory of political authority, because it was popular among the Foun-
ders.24 But because many today no longer accept this theory, I will 
also attempt to outline how such justifications might fare under theo-
ries that do not take political authority to depend upon consent. 
19 Id. at 158. 
20 Id. at 156. 
21 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. 
22 To be sure, he also speaks of the Second Amendment as codifYing a preexist-
ing legal right created by the English Bill of Rights. Id. at 2797-2800. But Scalia 
quotes favorably views that this English right was grounded in a natural right. Id. at 
2799 ("It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed 
by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence." (quoting Journal of Occur-
rences: March 17, N.Y.]., Apr. 13, 1769, at supp. 2) ); id. at 2798; see also David B. Kopel, 
The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's Lesson for the World, 58 SYRAcusE L. REv. (forth-
coming 2008) (manuscript at 1), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=1172255. 
23 See joHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATJSE ON CIVJL GovERNMENT (Prometheus 
Books 1986) (1690). 
24 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
182-87 (1967); LEONARD W. LEW, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE fRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 
139 (1988); GoRDoN S. WooD, THE RADICAUSM OF THE Al\1ERICAN REvoLUTION 164-66 
(1992). 
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I. JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON SELF-DEFENSE 
As we have seen, Scalia understood the Second Amendment as 
protecting "an individual right to use arms for self-defense."25 But the 
question remains why such an individual right exists. What is the 
value to individuals of bearing arms in self-defense? 
A. Public Safety 
The first and most straightforward argument is that allowing indi-
viduals to possess arms for use in Uustifiable) self-defense increases 
the likelihood that innocent life will be preserved. Since each of us 
has an interest in preserving his innocent life, we have an interest in 
private arms possession, an interest that is sufficiently fundamental to 
limit the authority of the government.26 It is not within the power 
even of a democratically elected government to undermine an individ-
ual's interest in the safety from harm that private arms possession 
brings. 
The first justification is unique among those discussed in this Arti-
cle in claiming that a system of private arms possession makes us safer 
from violence at the hands of our fellow citizens. As we shall see, the 
remaining justifications do not demand that it have this beneficial 
effect. 
Scalia never explicitly endorses the first justification. To be sure, 
he speaks of the usefulness of arms, and particularly of handguns, 
when engaging in justifiable self-defense.27 But even if I am made 
safer with respect to a fixed population by possessing a gun,28 it does 
not follow that a system in which citizens are generally allowed to own 
arms for self-defense will make me safer than one in which we are all 
disarmed. 
Possessing a gun can expose others to risks of harm. These risks 
include the possibilities: (1) that the owner will use his gun to commit 
25 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2811. 
26 For possible examples of this argument, see Samuel C. Wheeler III, Self-Defense: 
Rights and Coerced Risk-Acceptance, 11 Pus. Arr. Q. 431 ( 1997); Jeffrey Snyder, Fighting 
Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a Handgun (Oct. 22, 1997), http:/ I 
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=ll43 ("[C]itizens have the right to defend 
themselves against criminal attack. And since criminals can strike almost anywhere at 
any time, the last thing government ought to be doing is stripping citizens of the most 
effective means of defending themselves."). 
27 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818-20. 
28 This might be doubted. Some of the risks that gun possession creates for the 
gun's owner are the possibilities: (1) that he might use it to commit suicide; (2) that 
. he might harm himself accidentally; or (3) that an assailant (or a child) might take his 
gun and use it against him. 
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a crime (including a crime of passion against a spouse or family mem-
ber); (2) that he might use the gun in a mistaken act of self-defense; 
and (3) that he might accidentally discharge the gun, harming some-
one.29 The mutual imposition of these risks of harm might collec-
tively render us less safe compared to compelled disarmament. In 
short, allowing private arms possession might put citizens in a pris-
oner's dilemma. The choice to arm dominates, in the sense that it is 
in one's interest to arm oneself, whether or not others do so as well. 
But when everyone makes the same choice, the mutually imposed 
risks of harm make us all worse off. 30 
1. Does a System of Private Arms Possession Make Us Safer? 
Much debate over the Second Amendment has revolved around 
this empirical question of the effects of a system of private arms pos-
session on public safety.31 If the government's choice were simply 
between successful disarmament and uncontrolled individual arms 
possession, it is very likely that the former would make citizens safer. 
But the matter is more complicated, because the government's choice 
is not between these two strategies. First of all, the government's pol-
icy of disarmament might be only partially successful. Indeed, it 
might predominantly affect law-abiding citizens, who would use arms 
in justified self-defense, without affecting the use of arms by criminals. 
The D.C. Circuit, whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in Heller, suggested that this is true, at least in the District of 
Columbia: 
As amici point out, and as D.C. judges are well aware, the black 
market for handguns in the District is so strong that handguns are 
readily available (probably at little premium) to criminals. It is 
29 For a discussion of these risks, see Guns in the Home, http:/ /www.bradycam-
paign.org/facts/issues/?page=home (April 2002) (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
30 Arms races between nations are routinely modeled as prisoner's dilemmas, so 
it should not be odd to understand individuals' decisions to arm analogously. See 
Russell Hardin, Unilateral Versus Mutual Disarmament, 12 PHIL & Pus. AFF. 236, 248 
(1983). 
31 Compare Barnett & Kates, supra note 17, at 1234-59 (arguing that the "more 
guns = more murders" assertion is empirically disproven), and John R. Lott, Jr. & 
David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUo. 1, 64-65 (1997) ("[C]oncealed handguns are the most cost-effective method of 
reducing crime .... "), with Guns in the Home, supra note 29 ("[G]uns kept in the 
home for self-protection are more often used to kill somebody you know than to kill 
in self-defense .... "). This debate is well described in Justice Breyer's dissent in 
Heller. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2832-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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asserted, therefore, that the D.C. gun control laws irrationally pre-
vent only law abiding citizens from owning handguns.32 
1 39 
Second, the government does not have to allow uncontrolled 
individual arms possession. It can regulate, at least to some extent, 
who may own firearms, which firearms may be owned, and how they 
are used-thereby increasing the use of arms in justified self-defense 
and decreasing accidental and intentional misuse of arms. 
It is possible, therefore, that a system of private arms possession 
would make us safer than disarmament. It is worth noting, however, 
that even if it does makes us safer, this is true within a particular con-
text, which might change. For example, if a policy of disarmament 
currently undermines public safety because the government is unable 
to effectively disarm criminals, the technological, legal, or political 
causes of this inability might later be overcome. One possible criti-
cism of the first justification, therefore, is that if private arms posses-
sion makes us safer, this fact is too contingent upon present 
circumstances to justifY anything as enduring as a constitutional right. 
2. If Private Arms Possession Makes Us Safer, Does That Mean It Is 
Beyond the Government's Authority to Disarm Us? 
Furthermore, even if it is true that a system of private arms posses-
sion makes us safer, that does not mean that the government would be 
acting outside its authority if it disarmed the population. One cannot 
assume that the government has exceeded its authority simply because 
it has made a mistake. An essential element of the government's 
authority is its ability to require a citizen to obey its decisions even if 
they are wrong.3 3 If the government's decisions were binding only if 
they were the best available, governmental authority would evaporate, 
since citizens would take themselves to have a reason to conform to a 
governmental decision only when they thought it was the best availa-
ble and so would have conformed even in the absence of the decision. 
They would, in effect, be free of a duty of obedience, able to enforce 
their own views about the scope of people's rights and duties. 
This is not to say that governmental authority over individuals 
must be unlimited. The government, we can assume, is not free to 
make mistakes concerning the fundamental interests of individuals, 
such as whether free speech should be suppressed or cruel and unu-
sual punishments imposed. But it must be allowed to make some mis-
32 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 n.l7 (D.C. Cir. 2007) . 
33 See, e.g., Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, in THE DuTY TO 
OBEY THE LAw 21 3, 222 (William A. Edmundson ed., 1999) ("The typical claim of the 
legal authority is that directions are to be followed even if they are wrong . . . . ") . 
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takes, and the question remains why disarmament is not one of those 
areas where governmental mistakes are permissible. 
The reason cannot simply be that our interest in safety is so signif-
icant that governmental decisions that impact it cannot be mistaken. 
One problem with such an argument is that if private arms possession 
makes us less safe, as many people believe, it would be beyond the 
government's authority to fail to disarm the population. My guess is 
that few defenders of the Second Amendment would concede that if 
they are wrong about the beneficial effects of private arms possession, 
a constitutional amendment requiring disarmament would be neces-
sary. What is more, the government routinely makes decisions-for 
example, concerning the distribution of police protection or when to 
go to war-that have profound consequences for our safety. And yet 
we consider ourselves obligated to accept these decisions even if they 
are mistaken. 
Of course, even if the government does not act beyond its author-
ity simply by making a mistake concerning public safety, it would surely 
be acting beyond its authority if it failed to provide citizens with a 
minimal level of safety. Locke thought that individuals had an inalien-
able right to a certain level of security from harm. It was not within 
the power of one submitting to governmental authority to give over to 
the government the right to make any decision it wants concerning 
his safety.34 No one can consent to be a slave, that is, someone who 
may be killed, or left to be killed, at will. 35 In particular, no one could 
consent to receive a level of security inferior to that experienced in 
the state of nature (that is, in the absence of governmental author-
ity) .36 Mter all, one leaves the state of nature and consents to govern-
mental authority to escape the violence and feuding of private 
enforcement of rights,37 and "no rational creature can be supposed to 
change his condition with an intention to be worse."38 
34 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 131, at 71-72. 
35 See id. § 23, at 18. 
36 See id. § 137, at 76 ("It cannot be supposed that [people] should intend ... to 
give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates ... ; 
this were to put themselves into a worse position than the state of Nature, wherein 
they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others .... "); see also A. 
joHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARcHY 50 (1993) ("Despotical power cannot be 
acquired by compact."). 
37 See infra Part I.D.l. 
38 LocKE, supra note 23, § 131, at 71-72. Locke's inalienability argument appears 
to appeal to the fact that it would be irrational to consent to be a slave. But Locke 
offers another argument that voluntary slavery is impossible, namely because 
"[n]obody can give more power than he has himself, and he that cannot take away his 
own life cannot give another power over it." /d. § 22, at 18. I cannot give someone 
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Could one argue that individuals have a right to bear arms 
because the government, by disarming us, would be failing to provide 
us with this minimal level of protection? One problem with this argu-
ment is that even if the government makes us less safe by disarming 
us, it does not follow that our total level of protection from violence 
would be inadequate. The government might still be providing us 
with the level of protection that is our right (for example, by station-
ing a policeman on every block). For such an argument to work, 
therefore, one would have to show not merely that private arms pos-
session makes us safer, but that its contribution to our safety is so 
profound that the government can provide us with the minimal level 
of security that is our right only if it allows us to be armed. That is an 
impossibly tall order. 
It is important to distinguish the first justification from another, 
which we will discuss later, that assumes that the government has 
already failed to provide us with the minimal level of personal security 
that is our right. 39 As we shall see, one advantage of this later justifica-
tion (our fifth) is that the government's failure can ground a right to 
bear arms whether or not arms make us safer. Once the government 
violates its obligations to provide security, we return to the state of 
nature, freeing us to use arms to protect ourselves despite any costs to 
our safety that private arms possession generates. But we are currently 
considering an argument that is different in two crucial respects from 
the fifth: ( 1) it claims that the government can remain within the lim-
its of its authority by giving us a right to bear arms, not that we have 
such a right because the government has lost its authority over us; and 
(2) it grounds the right to bear arms in the contribution that arms 
make to our safety, rather than claiming that we have such a right 
whether or not we are made safer as a result. 
A final reason that the public safety benefits of private arms pos-
session might justify a right to bear arms is that governmental deci-
sions concerning public safety that are manifestly wrong are beyond the 
government's authority, even when the government is providing indi-
the right to kill me arbitrarily, not because I have the right to kill myself arbitrarily 
that I cannot alienate, but simply because I have no right to kill myself arbitrarily to 
begin with. For a further discussion of this argument, see A. John Simmons, Inaliena-
ble Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 175, 197-98 (1983). 
Of course, many modern philosophers reject consent theories of political obliga-
tion. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. But even these philosophers see 
political authority as limited by certain fundamental interests of individuals. These 
would presumably include an interest in a certain minimal level of security. 
39 See infra Part I.E.l. 
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viduals with the level of security that is their right. A law prohibiting 
arms possession might be such a manifest error. 
The idea that manifest errors are beyond the government's 
authority would not lead governmental authority to evaporate. It is 
true that I have not submitted to the government's authority if I 
reserve the right to reject its decisions whenever they are wrong. But 
refusing to submit to manifestly wrong decisions is not the same as 
refusing to submit to wrong decisions.40 It is compatible with the gov-
ernment's authority to regulate farm production, for example, that 
farmers would not be bound by a regulation compelling them to sow 
their fields with stones rather than seeds. 
A limitation on governmental authority for manifest errors might 
explain why individuals have a fundamental interest in self-defense (as 
distinguished from a fundamental interest in bearing arms for self-
defense). Many people, including Locke, have argued that the gov-
ernment cannot permissibly prohibit citizens from engaging in self-
defense in cases of imminent violence. 41 One reason for this limit on 
the authority of the state may be that the public safety benefits of self-
defense are so manifest.42 
It certainly seems that the prohibition of some acts of self-defense 
would manifestly fail to promote public safety. Imagine that a govern-
ment completely forbids self-defense even against culpable aggressors. 
If a violent intruder enters my home, I may do nothing to defend 
myself, even if I find flight impossible. The most I can do is inform 
the intruder that his actions are illegal and subject to punishment by 
the government. Such a law, if in fact complied with by the popula-
tion, would compromise public safety. It is true that it would discour-
age wrongful or mistaken acts of self-defense-and we would benefit 
insofar as we might be the target of such acts. But the cost to our 
safety would be great, since we would be uniquely vulnerable to acts of 
violence by culpable aggressors.43 The possibility of punishment after 
40 See JosEPH RAz, THE MoRALITY OF FREEDOM 38-42 (1986). 
41 See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 23, § 19, at 16-17; see also GEORGE BoWYER, CoM-
MENTARIES ON UNIVERSAL PuBLIC LAw 233 (London, V&R Stevens & G.S. Norton 1854) 
("Every man has a right to defend himself or his property, or even to defend others, 
where there is not time or opportunity to call the aid of the civil power."). 
42 As we shall later see, individuals' right to self-defense might be justified on 
grounds other than public safety. See infra Part I.B. 
43 Examples of public safety arguments for self-defense can be found at PAUL H. 
RoBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES§ 131 (a) (1984); BoAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN 
CRIMINAL LAw § 1.6 (2006); Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to 
Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1397-98 (1999); and 
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of justification: Deeds v. Reasons, reprinted in HARM 
AND CuLPABILITY 45, 46 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996). 
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the fact would not be enough to protect us. Indeed, in many cases 
punishment might not occur at all, since the best witness for the pros-
ecution would be dead. 
But even if a limitation on governmental authority for manifest 
errors could justify a right to self-defense, it is unlikely to justify a right 
to bear arms. A law compelling disarmament in the interest of public 
safety, even if in fact a mistake, is hardly manifestly a mistake. The 
question of whether arms possession makes us safer is one concerning 
which there is reasonable disagreement. This suggests that it is pre-
cisely the sort of issue that is within the scope of the government's 
authority. 
As we have seen, the opinion of the court of appeals in Heller 
suggested that the District of Columbia's ban on handguns might be a 
manifest error, because it "irrationally prevent[s] only law abiding citi-
zens from owning handguns."44 But the District could plausibly argue 
that the reason the ban currently makes citizens of the District less 
safe is because of the failure of neighboring states to enact similar bans. 
Gun violence, it could argue, must be overcome through collective 
action. And collective action will not occur unless some government 
takes the first step, even if the first mover will temporarily make its 
citizens worse off. It is hard to see how it is beyond a government's 
authority to adopt such a strategy. 
3. Are Constitutional Rights That Promote Public Safety Necessary? 
But let us assume that the Founders, in addition to thinking that 
there were public safety benefits to private arms possession, believed 
that these benefits somehow limited the government's authority to dis-
arm the population. It still is unclear why they would have thought 
that a constitutional right protecting this limit should be necessary. 
Consider, once again, self-defense in cases of imminent violence 
at the hands of culpable aggressors. If we have a fundamental interest 
in self-defense in such cases, why is there no right to self-defense speci-
fied in the U.S. Constitution?45 The reason, surely, is that constitu-
44 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
45 To the extent that protection for fundamental interests might be read into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, one could argue that 
there is such a constitutional right. But the question would still remain why the fun-
damental interest in self-defense was not explicitly protected the way privacy and dig-
nitary interests were explicitly protected by the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 
Courts have generally refused to read a constitutional right of self-defense into 
the Due Process Clause. See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994); 
White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 347 (6th Cir. 1986); Fields v. Harris, 675 F.2d 219, 220 
(8th Cir. 1982). But see Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1177 (4th Cir. 1986), with-
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tional rights are needed to protect only those limits on governmental 
authority that might conceivably be violated. The dangers that would 
result from prohibiting all acts of self-defense would be so widespread 
that a democratic government, being sensitive to the interests of the 
majority, would never enact such a law. 
In contrast, the fundamental interests protected by other provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights could conceivably be sacrificed by the major-
ity, making constitutional rights protecting these interests advisable. 
A common justification for the Eighth Amendment, for example, is 
that without it the dignitary interests of those convicted of crimes 
would be sacrificed to create punishments with maximum deterrent 
effect.46 Majoritarian processes cannot be counted on to protect 
these interests, because the costs of protection are felt by everyone (in 
the form of increased crime), while the benefits are felt only by crimi-
nal defendants. 
A similar story can be told about many other constitutional rights. 
The standard theory of the Fourth Amendment47 is that it keeps the 
privacy interests of those suspected of crimes from being sacrificed for 
the benefits that the majority would receive from more efficient 
enforcement of the criminal law.48 And a common, if not the stan-
dard, theory of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment49 is 
that it keeps the autonomy interests that individuals have in speaking 
drawn, 795 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1986); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(Merritt, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Constitution prohibits a state from elimi-
nating the justification of self-defense). For the argument that a constitutional right 
to self-defense exists, see Nicholas]. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individ-
ual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RuTGERS LJ. 1, 1-16 (1992) 
(arguing that the right to self-defense is incorporated within the Ninth Amendment); 
Anders Kaye, Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and Prison Conditions 
Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 693, 704-09 (1996); James E. Robertson, "Fight or 
F . .. "and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggres-
sors, 29 IND. L. REv. 339, 358-59 (1995). 
46 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 269-305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
47 U.S. CaNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized."). 
48 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 772 (1966). 
49 U.S. CaNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech .... "). 
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their own minds from being sacrificed to protect the public from the 
dangers that such speech might cause.50 
But we have as yet no analogous story of how the majority would 
be motivated to sacrifice the fundamental interest in possessing arms 
to which the first justification appeals. The benefits of arms posses-
sion, like the benefits of self-defense, are apparently widespread. If 
private arms possession makes us safer, the majority should be in favor 
of it, making constitutional protection unnecessary.51 
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine why a government that is 
insensitive to the interests of the majority might be motivated to disarm 
the population. Such a tyrannical government might choose disarma-
ment, despite any costs to public safety, because it is worried that an 
armed citizenry could rise up against it. But this speaks to the sixth 
50 See, e.g., David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory 
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 90 (1974) [hereinafter Richards, Obscenity 
Law]; David AJ. Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 323, 324-25 
(1988) [hereinafter Richards, Toleration]. 
51 It is conceivable that only a minority is made safer by a system of private arms 
possession, while the majority benefits from disarmament. Such an idea appears to 
stand behind Lester Hunt's and Todd Hughes' defense of the right to bear arms. See 
Todd C. Hughes & Lester H. Hunt, The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms, 14 PuB. 
AFF. Q. 1 (2000). Hunt and Hughes argue that even if private arms possession makes 
the majority safer, that does not mean that the government may permissibly disarm 
individuals: 
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the alleged causal relation-
ship between guns and crime really exists. Is this sufficient to justifY a gov-
ernment ban on firearms? In a liberal state, the answer is simple: it is no. In 
a consistently liberal system, it is considered highly problematic to dispose of 
the rights and liberties of citizens-where these rights and liberties are 
believed by their owners to be important-simply and solely because the 
community can extract a benefit from doing so. 
I d. at 2. The fact that guns as a class are dangerous to the population "is not a legiti-
mate reason for banning guns." Id. at 11. In particular, a policy of disarmament 
violates the individual rights of someone who needs arms in self-defense: "To disarm 
[such a person], exposing her to mortal danger, because of behavior for which she 
apparently bears no causal responsibility at all, is grossly unfair to her." Id. at 12. 
Hunt and Hughes do not explain, however, why the benefits the minority 
receives from arms possession give it a fundamental interest that can compromise the 
safety of the majority. As we have seen, by assuming that the minority is made less safe 
by disarmament we do not yet know the aggregate risk of harm to which it is exposed. 
It might be receiving the minimal level of security that is its right. If the package of 
methods that the government uses to protect citizens from violence is providing it 
with an adequate level of protection, how can it object that disarmament is part of 
that package? Hunt and Hughes appear to assume, without argument, that disarma-
ment would take the minority below the minimal level of security that the government 
must provide. 
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justification for the Second Amendment, which I will discuss later.52 
Under this justification, the Second Amendment exists as a protection 
against tyranny. Individuals should be given arms for the purpose of a 
popular revolution, rather than for private self-defense. 
In his opinion, Scalia manages to sidestep the problem of the 
Founders' motivation for constitutionally protecting the public safety 
benefits of private arms possession. He admits that the enactment of 
the Second Amendment was not motivated by a desire to protect the 
use of arms in self-defense. The Founders, he argued, were contem-
plating the justification expressed in the prefatory clause (probably 
our sixth). But he insists that even if "self-defense had little to do with 
the right's codification; it was the central component of the right 
itself."53 Although the Founders had no motivation to constitutionally 
protect the use of arms in self-defense, such protection was a side 
effect of the constitutional protection of its use to overthrow or dis-
courage tyranny. 
4. A Puzzle Concerning Scope 
Assuming that the Second Amendment protects private arms pos-
session because of its public safety benefits, what consequences does 
this have for the Amendment's scope? If the first justification is cor-
rect, the Second Amendment constitutionalizes the empirical judg-
ment that private arms possession promotes public safety. As a result, 
courts would have to be skeptical about legislatures' judgments con-
cerning the public safety benefits of arms regulation. But we do not 
know how far this skepticism is supposed to go. Assume, for example, 
that the legislature chooses to ban machine guns because it thinks this 
will promote public safety. Most defenders of the Second Amend-
ment believe that this is constitutionally permissible. Don Kates has 
argued, for example, that the right to bear arms would not apply to 
"weapons such as machine-type guns, flamethrowers, artillery, and 
atomic weapons, whose use, even in strict self-defense, would quite 
obviously menace one's neighbors."54 
On the one hand, we can criticize Kates' argument on the merits: 
if, as he believes, our system of private ownership of handguns makes 
us safer, this must be because the system is distributing them to a siza-
52 See infra Part II.A. 
53 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008). 
54 Kates, supra note 17, at 146; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers 
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms, "LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Win-
ter 1986, at 151, 160 ("[H]eavy ordinances are not constitutionally protected. Nor are 
other ... unusual weapons ... ." (citations omitted)). 
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ble number of law-abiding citizens who are able to exercise good judg-
ment about when they can be used justifiably. If everyone constantly 
used handguns carelessly or mistakenly-if, for example, they often 
pointed them in the wrong direction-disarmament would surely be a 
better option. But in this respect machine guns look much more like 
handguns than nuclear weapons. Although the rapid succession of 
machine gun fire to some extent heightens the risk of unjustified 
harm to third parties, machine guns are perfectly safe if pointed in 
the right direction. If Kates is right that our handguns will generally 
be pointed in the right direction, why wouldn't the same thing be true 
about our machine guns? The two weapons, it seems, should share 
the same constitutional fate. 
But the more fundamental problem with Kates' argument is that 
he appeals to considerations of public safety to determine the scope of 
the Second Amendment. And the Second Amendment is meant to 
constitutionally mandate skepticism about public safety arguments.55 
How do we know that Kates' argument is not one of those about 
which a court should be skeptical? To be sure, he has offered a plausi-
ble argument that prohibition of machine guns would make us 
safer.56 But the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence can offer 
plausible arguments that the prohibition of handguns-or, indeed, all 
guns-would make us safer. If a court is not allowed to accept the 
Brady Campaign's arguments, how do we know it can accept Kates'? 
The first justification makes the Second Amendment look very 
different from many other provisions in the Bill of Rights. As we have 
seen, rather than having been enacted because of public safety consid-
erations, many provisions in the Bill of Rights exist to keep autonomy 
interests from being sacrificed for public safety. To determine the 
scope of these constitutional rights, the strength of these autonomy 
interests can be our guide.57 But because under the firstjustification 
the Second Amendment protects public safety, nothing like this pro-
cedure is possible. 
55 See supra Part I.A.2-3. 
56 BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GuN VIOLENCE, WITHOUT A TRAcE: How THE GuN 
LoBBY AND THE GoVERNMENT SuPPREss THE TRUTH ABouT GuNs AND CRIME 18 (2006), 
http:/ /www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/giw.pdf ("Crime gun tracing stud-
ies show that gun laws, by regulating the behavior of gun sellers and buyers in the 
legal market, have a profound impact on access to guns by criminals in the illegal 
market."). 
57 It is common in Fourth Amendment contexts to" 'balanc[e] ... intrusion on 
the individual's [privacy] interests against ... promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests,'" including governmental interests in public safety. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that Scalia answered the question 
of which arms are protected by the Second Amendment in a manner 
unrelated to considerations of public safety. Drawing on United States 
v. Miller, 58 he argued that individuals have a constitutionally protected 
interest only in arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes."59 This principle excludes "dangerous and unusual 
weapons" such as machine guns. 60 
The fact that a category of weapon passes the Miller test does not 
mean that we would not be safer if it were prohibited. According to 
the Miller test, machine guns would be constitutionally protected if 
their possession became widespread. And yet they still might under-
mine public safety.61 By the same token, the fact that a newly invented 
category of weapon fails the Miller test-because, being new, it is not 
typically possessed-does not mean that its widespread possession 
would not substantially contribute to our safety.62 The scope of the 
Second Amendment becomes unrelated to its underlying justification. 
Indeed the Miller test is unrelated not merely to the interests 
appealed to in the first justification, but also to those standing behind 
the sixth. If the purpose of the Second Amendment is to discourage 
governmental tyranny, citizens arguably have an interest in possessing 
machine guns, since any tyrannical government would have such 
weapons at its disposal. 63 
As we have seen, a question of scope not answered in Scalia's 
opinion is the standard of review used to assess laws that infringe 
upon individuals' Second Amendment interests. An example is a law 
that prohibits all convicted felons from owning any firearms. One 
might think that if the first justification is correct, strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard. After all, under the first justification the Sec-
ond Amendment protects citizens' interests in their self-preservation. 
This interest is one of the strongest imaginable. The government, one 
might argue, cannot sacrifice this interest unless it has an extremely 
compelling reason. 
Keep in mind, however, that the first justification gives the Sec-
ond Amendment a purpose importantly different from other provi-
58 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
59 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008). 
60 /d. at 2817. 
61 See id. at 2869 (Breyer,J., dissenting). 
62 See id. 
63 Scalia recognizes this problem. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (majority 
opinion). 
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sions in the Bill of Rights. The Eighth Amendment64 exists to keep 
the majority from sacrificing individuals' dignitary interest for some 
other governmental goal, such as deterring crimes. The strength of 
the Eighth Amendment, therefore, is tied to the strength of this digni-
tary interest. But under the first justification the majority is likely to 
disarm the population, not because it wants to sacrifice citizens' inter-
est in self-preservation for some other governmental goal, but instead 
because it thinks disarmament protects this interest. The strength of 
the Second Amendment should be tied, therefore, not to the strength 
of individuals' interest in safety, but to the strength of the empirical 
conclusion standing behind the Second Amendment that private arms 
possession best promotes safety. The question of the standard of 
review should depend upon the strength of this empirical conclusion. 
The same point would apply to the question of whether Second 
Amendment rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Second Amendment rights are fundamental and so deserving 
of incorporation only to the extent that the empirical conclusion 
standing behind the Second Amendment is strong. 
There is a final reason to question the first justification. It is a 
significant fact that support for the Second Amendment remains even 
in the face of evidence that gun ownership makes us less safe.65 In 
affirming the right to bear arms despite this evidence, Second Amend-
ment advocates sound like traditional civil libertarians. The Fourth 
Amendment likely makes us less safe, given the frequency with which 
its exercise frustrates otherwise legitimate criminal prosecutions. But 
this does nothing to undermine its justification. To its defenders, the 
same point applies to the Second Amendment.66 We therefore 
should take seriously arguments that the right to bear arms in self-
defense is justified by an autonomy interest unrelated to questions of 
public safety. 67 
64 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
65 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1293-94 (2003) 
("[H]ow an individual feels about gun control will depend a lot on the social mean-
ings that she thinks guns and gun control express, and not just on the consequences 
she believes they impose."). 
66 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion 
and Gun Rights, 50 RuTGERS L. REv. 97, 129 n.144 (1997) ("The fact that a right is 
relatively costly does not justifY giving it a narrow, rather than broad construction."); 
Levinson, supra note 4, at 657 (" [W] hy do we not apply such consequentialist criteria 
to each and every part of the Bill of Rights?"). 
67 To be sure, this support for private arms possession in the face of gun violence 
could be explained by the idea that it protects against a tyrannical government. Peo-
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To make the difference between the first and subsequentjustifi-
cations clear, I will assume in what follows that a system of private 
arms possession makes us more vulnerable to private violence. The 
choice to arm oneself presents a prisoner's dilemma. The choice 
dominates, in the sense that it makes one safer compared to a fixed 
population. But when everyone bears arms, the mutually imposed 
risks make us all worse off. The remaining justifications claim that 
private arms possession has value meriting constitutional protection 
despite this fact.68 
B. Excuse 
Let us return to the "natural right of resistance and self-preserva-
tion,"69 which Scalia thinks is connected to the right to bear arms. We 
have already discussed a public safety argument for a natural right of 
self-defense. But there are circumstances where we think individuals 
should be allowed to engage in self-defense even when no clear public 
safety benefits can be discerned. Consider, for example, the innocent 
threat, as described by Robert Nozick: 
If someone picks up a third party and throws him at you down at the 
bottom of a deep well, the third party is innocent and a threat; had 
he chosen to launch himself at you in that trajectory he would be an 
aggressor. Even though the falling person would survive his fall 
onto you, may you use your ray gun to disintegrate the falling body 
before it crushes and kills you? 70 
Although the legal status of self-defense against innocent threats 
is unclear,7 1 many people believe that self-defense in such cases 
should be permitted.72 We cannot justifY this right of self-defense on 
public safety grounds, for allowing self-defense against innocent 
pie might be willing to accept gun violence in order to receive security against 
tyranny. 
68 Of course, it is not essential to these later justifications that private arms posses-
sion undermines public safety. These justifications simply claim that its value is unre-
lated to considerations of public safety. But this is best highlighted by assuming 
scenarios where its contribution to public safety is negative. 
69 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2838 (2008) (quoting 1 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 8, at *139)_ 
70 RoBERT NozJCK, ANARCI-N, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34 (1974); see also Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 283, 287 (1991) (presenting another 
example of the innocent threat and concluding that there is no moral difference in 
the use of self-defense when the aggressor is innocent or villainous). 
71 See Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 
64 CAL. L. REv. 871, 875-76 (1976). 
72 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST.j. CruM. L. 449, 
468-69 (2008) ("[A]t the very least, a liberal state should excuse the killing of an 
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threats does not increase the likelihood that innocent life will be 
saved. 
Why do we think self-defense in such cases is justified? One possi-
bility is that it is not justified at all, but simply excused. 73 Defending 
oneself against an innocent threat should not be punished, because 
we would never be able to abide by a law prohibiting self-defense 
when the time came. The desire for self-protection would simply be 
too great. We would always defend ourselves and take the chance of 
punishment for violating the law. Given that we cannot abide by a law 
prohibiting self-defense in such circumstances, it is beyond the gov-
ernment's authority to enact such a law. 
Excuse is arguably the reason that Hobbes thought that "the right 
of resisting them that assault him by force" cannot be alienated, even 
to the sovereign. 74 A number of Second Amendment advocates have 
appealed to such passages in Hobbes as support for an inalienable 
right to bear arms. This suggests that they think the right to bear 
arms, like the right to self-defense, is based on excuse.75 Scalia too 
might be referring to excuse when he speaks of the right to bear arms 
as grounded in a "natural right of resistance and self-preservation."76 
But excuse is insufficient to justify a right to bear arms. Self-
defense is excused because we could not possibly abide by a law 
prohibiting self-defense. We would always defend ourselves even if 
innocent aggressor because the defender in such a case has lived up to all we can 
reasonably expect of him." ) ; Kadish, supra note 71, at 875-76. 
73 Both Kadish and Ferzan themselves suggest that self-defense against an inno-
cent is justified rather than excused. See Ferzan, supra note 72, at 452; Kadish, supra 
note 71, at 881-82. I shall not discuss this issue here. 
74 See THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 
1994) (1651). It is not clear, however, that Hobbes is arguing for an excuse in the 
normal sense of the word at all. He might be arguing for something like a 
Hohfeldian privilege to engage in self-defense. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HoHFELD, FuN-
DAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN juDICIAL REAsoNING 35-50 (photo. 
reprint 2000) (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) . One will not be violating any duties 
to the sovereign by resisting, but the sovereign will not be violating any duties by 
punishing one's resistance. See Finkelstein, supra note 43, at 1388-90; Jeremy Wal-
dron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CAL. L. REv. 711, 732 
(2000) . For a fuller discussion of Hobbes's argument, see Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle 
About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAc. PHIL. Q. 332 (2001). For an excuse theory of self-
defense, see Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Pmtection, 74 NoTRE 
DAME L. REv. 1475 (1999). 
75 See Barnett & Kates, supra note 17, at 1177-78 n.l84; Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 119 
(1987). 
76 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2838 (2008) (quoting I BLACK-
STONE, supra note 8, at *139) . 
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self-defense were subject to very serious penalties. It is simply false, 
however, that people could not possibly abide by a law prohibiting 
private arms possession. If that were true, it would be impossible for 
the government to disarm us. We would always choose to remain 
armed, and take the punishment for violating the law. But there sim-
ply is no overwhelming desire to possess arms that is analogous to our 
instinct to defend ourselves in response to an immediate threat. For 
this reason, the government has no grounds for excusing arms 
possession. 
It is true that someone faced with imminent violence will have an 
overwhelming desire for a gun-a desire so strong that he would be 
willing to arm himself at that time whatever the law says about the mat-
ter. This could excuse someone, like MacGyver, who fashions arms on 
the spot to deal with the threat. 77 It would also excuse anyone who 
grabs arms that happen to be at hand to protect himself. But the fact 
that the government cannot prohibit a citizen from using arms that 
are in fact present does not mean that it cannot prohibit that citizen 
from having them present in the first place. 
This is not to say that many people do not experience a strong 
desire to arm themselves, even when they are not currently facing an 
attacker. But rather than being the sort of irresistible impulse that 
could be the basis of an excuse, this desire can be explained by the 
fact that arming oneself is the dominant strategy in a prisoner's 
dilemma. One will always be safer compared to a fixed population if 
one is armed. But even if arms possession is attractive for this reason, 
it still might be the case that when we all choose to arm ourselves, the 
mutually imposed risks of harm make us collectively worse off. Since a 
primary purpose of a government's authority is overcoming prisoner's 
dilemmas, the fact that we desire arms is no reason to think that dis-
armament is beyond the government's authority. 
C. Equality 
Another common argument for private arms possession appeals 
to the leveling character of arms. They reduce disparities in physical 
strength: 
The capacity of firearms to be a tool for self-defense promotes 
equality in general, and not merely between battered women and 
their male batterers . . . . The force of non-gun weapons such as 
knives and clubs is, like the force of bare hands, strongly contingent 
on the size, strength, and skill of their users: the weaker of two peo-
ple equally armed with a non-gun weapon is still at a potentially fatal 
77 MacGyver (ABC television broadcast 1985-1992). 
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disadvantage. In typical self-defense situations, however, firearms 
are equally harmful in anyone's hands, provided the individuals 
handling them have the capacity to fire them and reasonably good 
aim at close range. Two people equally armed with guns, then, are 
very likely to have equal harming and coercive power, regardless of 
their physical disparities. Firearms actually equalize the balance of 
power between persons who are naturally unequal. 78 
153 
Of course, we can question whether arms really have an equalizing 
effect. For example, if men, in addition to being generally larger and 
stronger, are naturally more aggressive and so more likely to acquire 
arms, allowing private arms possession may exacerbate the inequality 
between the sexes. But let us assume that the equalizing effect is real. 
Another problem with this justification is that if the value of arms 
lies in their equalizing effect, it would appear to justify arms posses-
sion only for those at a physical disadvantage. Giving arms to the 
physically dominant frustrates the goal of equalization. So we would 
not have an argument that all citizens have a fundamental interest in 
arms possession. 
But, more significantly, it is hard to see how a compelling argu-
ment for the Second Amendment can be derived simply from the 
equalizing effect of arms. We need to keep in mind that we are trying 
to figure out why individuals have a fundamental interest in private 
arms possession even if arms reduce public safety-that is, even if peo-
ple are made more vulnerable to armed criminal assaults. I doubt 
that equality of physical strength is such an important value that we 
would be willing to limit a democratic government's ability to make 
the public safer to protect it. 
In fact, the third justification is probably a version of the first. 
Those offering such an argument are probably envisioning the equal-
izing effect of innocent women using arms in justified self-defense 
against culpable men. They are not thinking of the equalizing effect 
of culpable women using arms to engage in violent criminal assaults 
against innocent men. Nor are they considering how, independent of 
the equalizing effect, arms might be used in violent criminal assaults 
by women against women and by men against men. By concentrating 
only on justified uses of arms they appear to assume that such uses 
predominate and thus that private arms possession makes us safer. 
They simply add to the first justification the observation that private 
arms possession brings a secondary beneficial effect-namely a reduc-
tion of the disadvantages felt by women, the small, and the weak. 
78 Hughes & Hunt, supra note 51 , at 16. 
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D. Lockean Autonomy 
The fourth justification is the most elusive, but in the end might 
be the most promising. It claims that individuals have a fundamental 
interest in possessing arms for self-defense, as an expression of Lock-
ean values of autonomy and individualism. But to show why arms pos-
session might be valuable for this reason, I need to say a bit more 
about Locke's political theory and why, according to Lockean princi-
ples, there is a right to bear arms in the state of nature. 
1. Locke on the Origin and Limits of Governmental Authority 
For Locke, the government's authority has its source in the con-
sent of the governed. People are free to live independently of any 
political obligation, in what he called the "state of nature," if they 
choose to do so. They have no duty to submit to the state. But Locke 
thought that individuals would in fact give up many of the rights they 
enjoy in the state of nature to the maJority (or the government to 
which the majority entrusts its power).79 Most significantly, they 
would give up their natural "executive" right to private enforcement 
of natural rights. Mter entering into the social contract, only the 
majority (or its government) possesses the power to adjudicate and 
punish violations of rights.80 Individuals are bound by its decision, 
even if they believe it is wrong. 
Individuals are motivated to enter into the social contract 
because of the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. 81 These incon-
veniences do not result from the fact that we may do whatever we 
want. Within the state of nature we have duties not "to harm another 
in his life, health, liberty or possessions."82 The problem is instead 
that we are fallible judges about whether natural rights have been vio-
lated. Although we have the power through reason to recognize the 
general principles of naturallaw,83 we can make mistakes, particularly 
in our application of the principles of natural law to the facts.84 This 
79 See LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 94-99, at 54-55. 
80 !d.§§ 95, 99, at 55-56; D.A. LLOYD THoMAS, LocKE ON GoVERNMENT 27 (1995). 
81 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 124-27, at 70-71. 
82 !d. § 6, at 9. 
83 !d. § 6, at 9, § 12, at 13, § 124, at 70. 
84 !d. § 124, at 70 ("[T]hough the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want 
of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it 
to their particular cases."); see also id. § 136, at 76-77 (discussing the need for stand-
ing laws to reduce human mistakes in adjudication). 
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is because we tend to interpret our own rights and the rights of our 
kin too broadly.s5 
As a result, the state of nature can devolve into a state of war. 
Someone who perceives his rights to have been violated will seek to 
exercise what he believes is his right to punish, creating what the pun-
ished party perceives to be a rights violation that in turn allows her to 
punish. Because of these mutually imposed risks of mistaken judg-
ments about rights violations, private enforcement puts everyone in a 
worse position than they would be if they were subject to a single arbi-
trator, even though the arbiter can itself make mistakes. 
But Locke did not think that individuals would alienate all their 
rights. Some they would reserve against the majority and its govern-
ment. Indeed, some rights, being inalienable, would remain reserved 
even if individuals tried to give them up. 86 If these reserved rights are 
violated, one is released from the government's authority and so may 
justifiably resist. A Lockean justification for the Second Amendment, 
therefore, would argue that individuals have a right to bear arms in 
the state of nature and that they reserved this right when entering into 
the social contract. Notice that it is not sufficient to argue, as Scalia 
does, that there is a natural right to bear arms, in the sense that one 
possesses that right in the state of nature. One must show that the 
natural right was reserved upon entering into the social contract. 
2. The Natural Right to Bear Arms 
Our first question is whether one has a right to bear arms in the 
state of nature. There is a simple argument that such a natural right 
exists. For Locke, the only rights possessed by a government are those 
alienated to it by individuals. Therefore, if individuals had no natural 
right to bear arms, nations would have no right to arm themselves. 
Although disarmament by nations is commonly thought to be advisa-
ble, few people would say that a nation is acting beyond its authority 
by having an army. 
But a more detailed Lockean argument for a natural right to bear 
arms can also be provided. The right, one can argue, is derivable 
from the natural executive right-that is, one's right in the state of 
85 /d. § 13, at 13, § 125, at 70. 
86 To say a right is inalienable is not to make a claim about the strength of the 
right. It does not mean, for example, that the right cannot be overridden by other 
moral considerations. Furthermore, to say that inalienable rights cannot be volunta-
rily relinquished does not mean that they cannot be forfeited, for example, through 
wrongdoing. On Locke's understanding of inalienable rights, see Simmons, supra 
note 38. 
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nature "to judge of his right [and], according to the best of his power 
to maintain it."87 Furthermore, this derivation makes it clear that the 
right to bear arms exists independently of any tendency of private 
arms possession to make us safer. 
It is worth emphasizing that the executive right itself cannot be 
understood as existing because it contributes to public safety or, more 
generally, because it ensures that our other natural rights will be 
respected.88 We enter into the social contract because our natural 
rights are less secure when we possess the executive right. With a 
right to private enforcement of natural rights, we overreach-and this 
overreaching results in violations of natural rights. If our only con-
cern were ensuring that our other natural rights were not violated, we 
would have no executive right at all. Instead, we would be morally 
required to give up our power to punish to the state.s9 And it is a 
defining characteristic of Locke's political theory, and consent theo-
ries of the state generally, that there is no duty, independent of that 
created by consent, to submit to governmental authority. 
We must assume, therefore, that Locke assigned a value to the 
executive right that is independent of its tendency to protect our 
other natural rights. He understood it to be valuable on its own, in a 
manner tied to fundamental principles of autonomy and individual-
ism. Each of us has the right to private enforcement of natural rights 
even though the combined effect of the exercise of this right is the 
increase in rights violations. 
Precisely because it increases the violation of our other natural 
rights, our executive right exists in uneasy tension with those other 
rights. It is tempting to resolve this tension by accommodating our 
other natural rights to our executive right. For example, one might 
argue that in the state of nature each of us has a Hohfeldian privilege 
to act as he sees morally fit. If I punish what I take to be a rights 
violation, I have not violated the punished person's natural rights. 
Conversely, if the punished person takes the punishment to be a 
rights violation, he will not violate my natural rights if he retaliates.90 
The inconveniences of the state of nature would result from the col-
lective exercise of these privileges. 
87 LocKE, supra note 23, § 91, at 51. 
88 Locke himself sometimes suggests this, for he argues that "every one has a right 
to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation ." 
/d. § 7, at 10. 
89 Cf DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GoVERNMENT 38-39 (1991) (suggesting 
that if one has a right to punish only by the least risky acceptable method, even those 
remaining in the state of nature have to let the state punish for them). 
90 See HoHFELD, supra note 74, at 35-50. 
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But this cannot make sense of Locke's frequent claims that natu-
ral rights are still the "measure God has set to the actions of men."91 
Those acting according to their moral lights in the state of nature 
remain responsible if they get things wrong. "[I]f he that judges, 
judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to 
the rest of mankind."92 One must conclude, therefore, that Locke 
thought that the executive right exists despite its conflict with our 
other natural rights. What is good about our executive right is not 
that it will increase the chance that natural rights are respected, but 
rather that it allows us to use our own moral judgment to take a 
chance-even a bad chance-at vindicating natural rights. 
A natural right to bear arms appears to follow from this executive 
right. We may bear arms in the state of nature because it allows us to 
more effectively enforce our own vision of natural rights. Arms are 
not good because they make us safer. Indeed, because they allow us 
to more effectively exercise our executive right, arms exacerbate the 
inconveniences of the state of nature. Feuding and mistaken acts of 
self-defense become more deadly when people are armed. But, once 
again, if these inconveniences were sufficient to justify disarmament, 
they would also justify a duty to submit to the state. 
This natural right to bear arms is not simply an agent-relative 
right that I assert for myself, as a means of vindicating my vision of 
natural rights.93 It is not as if, from my perspective, I can arm myself 
and disarm you and, from your perspective, you can arm yourself and 
disarm me. Rather, the right is one that each must extend to every-
one else in the state of nature. I may not disarm you simply because 
of the chance that you may make a mistake concerning natural rights. 
You too have the right to take a chance and vindicate natural rights as 
you see fit. But you remain answerable for the consequences. If I find 
that you have misused your guns, I may retaliate. 
It is a delicate matter, however, determining the strength and 
scope of the natural right to bear arms. Although it gives each of us 
the freedom to expose one another to a heightened risk of rights vio-
lations, there is surely some point at which the risk becomes so great 
that the person exposed may take preventative action. Locke is clear 
that in the state of nature I may permissibly thwart attempts to violate 
91 LocKE, supra note 23, § 8, at 10-11; see also id. § 241, at 131 (declaring that 
God is "judge of the right"). 
92 /d.§ 13, at 14; see also id. § 4, at 8, § 17, at 15-16, §59, at 34-35, § 128, at 71, 
§§ 241-42, at 131 (acknowledging that in the state of nature, men are subject and 
bound by the law of nature). We are answerable for the consequences even if our 
decision was reasonable when made. See SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 145. 
93 I thank Stephen Perry for motivating me to clarify this point. 
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my natural rights. My respect for another's executive right does not 
require me to wait until my rights have actually been violated to 
respond.94 In the course of thwarting such attempts, I surely may dis-
arm my attacker. 
But I may not disarm someone who merely possesses a firearm. It 
is true that people tend to make mistakes about the proper scope of 
natural rights and so misuse of the firearm might occur. Indeed, it is 
possible that we would all be safer if we were forcibly disarmed. But, 
again, if the inconveniences of the state of nature could justify dis-
armament, they could also justify forcible induction into the state. 
And that is contrary to core Lockean principles. In the state of 
nature, therefore, individuals possess a right to bear arms, including 
dangerous arms like machine guns. 
Many arguments that the right to bear arms is tied to a natural 
right of self-defense can be interpreted as referring to our natural 
executive right. Such arguments often wrongly emphasize little old 
ladies using guns to protect themselves against violent assailants.95 
This suggests that the acts covered by the natural right of self-defense 
include only justified self-defense and that arms are valuable for the 
reasons claimed by the first justification. Because the use of arms in 
justified self-defense will outweigh their unjustified use, a system of 
private arms possession makes us safer from unjustified harm. But 
also present in such arguments is the idea that the use of arms even in 
unjustified self-defense has value. Arms are valuable not merely when 
a little old lady justifiably kills a violent assailant, but also when she 
kills a postman, mistaking him for a violent assailant. For in the latter 
case as well, she was able to vindicate what she took to be her rights-
and face the consequences. It is because Second Amendment advo-
cates see arms as tied to one's natural executive right-and more 
broadly to Lockean values of autonomy and individualism-that they 
so often claim that gun ownership fosters "vigorous virtues of indepen-
dence, self-reliance, and vigilance."96 
94 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 16, at 15. 
95 See, e.g., RoBERT A. WATERS, THE BEST DEFENSE (1998); RoBERT A. WATERS, 
GuNs SAVE LIVEs (2002); Robert L. Barrow, Women with Attitude: Self Protection, Policy, 
and the Law, 21 T.jEFFERSON L. REv. 59,59-60 (1999). 
96 David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU 
L. REv. 55, 100; see also Kahan & Braman, supra note 65, at 1300-01 (referencing 
works that have identified guns as symbols of honor, courage, chivalry, and individual 
self-sufficiency); Bruce Mills, Editorial, Gun Ownership Is a Net Benefit to Society, HAMIL-
TON SPEGfATOR (Can.), Oct. 19, 2006, at A14 ("The gun culture ... fosters indepen-
dence, self-reliance, self-esteem and confidence in the individual."); Glenn Reynolds, 
Editorial, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A21 (describing a town's 
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3. Wasn't the Natural Right to Bear Arms Alienated Upon 
Entering the Social Contract? 
1 59 
But to say that there is a natural right to bear arms does not mean 
that individuals have a fundamental interest in arms possession that 
limits the authority of the government-for the natural right might 
have been alienated upon entering the social contract. 
Many Second Amendment advocates argue that the right is ina-
lienable. As Charlton Heston, then President of the National Rifle 
Association, put it: 
What civil right could possibly be more fundamental than the 
right to protect your life, your family and your freedom from who-
ever would take it away? 
The right to keep and bear arms may be our Second Amend-
ment as Americans, but you can bet on this: It's our first freedom as 
humans. 
"All men were created equal" may have been our message in 
1963. 
Today, let our message be just as simple and just as strong: "All 
people have an unalienable right to defend their lives and their lib-
erty from whomever [sic] would harm them, and with whatever 
means necessary."97 
Once again, this might be understood as the first justification. 
Heston might be claiming that a system of private arms possession so 
contributes to our safety that we have a fundamental interest in own-
ing arms, an interest that we cannot relinquish. But Heston's claim 
that the right allows one to use any means necessary, apparently with-
out regard for the mutually imposed risks that might result, suggests 
that he believes this right exists even if we are made less safe as a 
result. He appears to be pointing to a right to bear arms that is 
derived from our natural executive right. 
But, so understood, Heston is clearly wrong that the right is ina-
lienable. There is no reason to think that we could not, in the interest 
of collective security, give up our natural right to bear arms. In fact, 
we have done so to some extent, insofar as we think is within the gov-
ernment's authority to prohibit very dangerous firearms such as 
machine guns, which we would be able to possess in the state of 
nature. 
mandatory gun ownership law as "a statement about preparedness in the event of an 
emergency, and an effort to promote a culture of self-reliance"). 
97 Charlton Heston, Address to the Congress of Racial Equality at Its Annual Ban-
quet in Honor of Dr. Martin Luther King,J r. (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www. 
newsmax.com/ archives/ articles/ 2001 / 3/19/21 0522.shtml. 
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Indeed, the idea that any part of the natural right to bear arms 
might have been reserved appears problematic. To be sure, we might 
reserve certain natural rights, like privacy, upon entering the social 
contract, even though these rights are alienable.98 But privacy has a 
value that continues to make sense when one is subject to the author-
ity of the state. The same, one might argue, is not true about arms. 
One enters into the social contract because of the inconveniences of 
the state of nature. Why reserve a right to something-like the posses-
sion of handguns-that brings about the very inconveniences that one 
is seeking to avoid? 
This resistance to the idea that any part of the natural right to 
bear arms would be reserved is undoubtedly tied to the idea that alien-
ation of the executive right-unlike the alienation of a right to pri-
vacy-is essential to the social contract. As Locke put it, when leaving 
the state of nature one must give up the liberty "to do whatsoever he 
thinks fit for the preservation of himself' and "the power to punish 
the crimes committed against [natural] law."99 One no longer pos-
sesses the right to act upon one's own judgment concerning the 
proper scope of self-defense and punishment. One is bound by the 
judgment of the majority even when one believes that its decision is 
mistaken.100 Since our executive right must be alienated, it appears 
that the right to bear arms-which is tied to the executive right-must 
also be. 101 
It is for this reason that many see Second Amendment advocates 
as "anarchistic"102 and opposed to "communal strateg[ies] for collec-
tive security."103 They seem to reject the very reason we have govern-
ments in the first place. As Gary Wills has put it: "Every civilized 
society must disarm its citizens against each other. . . . Every handgun 
owned in America is an implicit declaration of war on one's neighbor. 
98 It seems permissible for individuals who are very worried about crime to give to 
the government greater investigative powers than the Fourth Amendment currently 
allows. If a Lockean understands the Fourth Amendment as enforcing a preexisting 
limitation on the authority of the government, therefore, he must understand the 
reserved right of privacy that the Amendment protects as alienable, but not in fact 
alienated. 
99 LocKE, supra note 23, § 128, at 71. 
100 See id. § 87, at 49. 
101 See Steven]. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 237, 243-44 (2000). 
102 Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden Histary of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
309, 320 (1998). 
103 Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16 
CoNST. CoMMENT. 247, 259 (1999). 
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When the chips are down, its owner says, he will not trust any other 
arbiter but force personally wielded."104 
It is undoubtedly true that any argument that the natural execu-
tive right limits the authority of the government faces an uphill battle. 
But simply because the executive right creates the inconveniences of 
the state of nature, it does not follow that upon submitting to govern-
mental authority its value evaporates. It remains something that we 
can appreciate. Indeed its value is constantly affirmed in popular cul-
ture, when a Charles Bronson figure takes the enforcement of rights 
into his own hands. 105 And because it has enduring attraction despite 
its costs, a Lockean might argue that someone entering the social con-
tract could, as a discretionary matter, choose to reserve it to some 
extent, while delineating the scope of the reserved right sufficiently to 
ensure that the most serious inconveniences of the state of nature are 
avoided. 
For example, individuals might reserve a right to duel-provided 
that its exercise would not devolve into a state ofwar. 106 This does not 
mean dueling is an inalienable right. It clearly is not. Nor do those 
reserving a right to duel have to believe that dueling is valuable 
because it tends to protect their other rights. They may recognize that 
people interpret the scope of their rights in their favor, making duel-
ing an inefficient method of rights enforcement. But they might nev-
ertheless reserve the right to duel out of respect for Lockean values of 
autonomy and individualism. 
A similar story might be told about the Second Amendment. Citi-
zens might have retained some of the natural right to bear arms, pro-
vided that it was carefully circumscribed to avoid too many of the 
inconveniences of the state of nature. Once again, this right would be 
reserved, even though it would increase the level of violence between 
private citizens, out of respect for Lockean values of autonomy and 
individualism. Such a justification captures the commonly held view 
that arms are "ideal symbols of freedom and sovereignty"107 and that 
104 Don B. Kates, Jr., Public opinion: The Effects of .Cxtremist Discourse on the Gun 
Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GuN DEBATE 93, 109 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck 
eds., 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
105 See DEATH WrsH (Dino DeLaurentis Company 1974) (depicting the story of 
Paul Kersey, a mild-mannered New York businessman turned vigilante after the mur-
der of his wife and rape of his daughter). 
106 One limitation that keeps dueling from descending into the state of war is that 
both parties to the duel consent to the harms that occur in the context of the duel. 
The fact that someone is killed in a duel may not itself be pointed to by the dece-
dent's kin as a wrong that justifies another duel. 
107 David Neilson, The Biggest Con (May 3, 2000), http:/ /www.keepandbeararms. 
com/information/XciBView I tern .asp?ID=619. 
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compelled disarmament by the government is a "humiliating and 
debasing degradation."10B 
But what about those who reject consent theories of the state? 
Mter all, Lockean theories of governmental authority are no longer in 
favor among political philosophers. John Rawls, for example, consid-
ered individuals to have a duty to support and obey the law of largely 
just states whether or not they have consented to the state's author-
ity.109 The duty exists simply by virtue of being human.1 10 Ronald 
Dworkin is another example of someone who does not take govern-
mental authority to rest upon consent. 111 
To be sure, even those who reject consent theories of political 
obligation see the authority of democratic governments as limited by 
certain fundamental interests of individuals. 112 For these philoso-
phers, therefore, a justification for the Second Amendment might still 
be available, if it was shown that individuals have a fundamental inter-
est in private arms possession that limits the authority of all govern-
ments. But a belief in a duty to submit to governmental authority 
makes it particularly difficult to see arms possession as a fundamental 
interest. A Lockean might admire Charles Bronson. But those who 
reject consent theories of political obligation, one might argue, would 
see no value in Bronson's exploits. They think that we have a duty to 
submit to governmental authority because of the risks created by pri-
vate enforcement-a duty, in short, not to be Charles Bronson. Since 
we have such a duty, how can they think we have a fundamental inter-
est in arms possession? 
108 James Biser Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. 
REv. 947, 963 n.52 (1992) (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADoPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 168 Oonathan Elliot ed., 
1836) (statement of Patrick Henry)); see also Justin Darr, Why Liberals Love Gun Con-
trol Uan. 10, 2005), http:/ /www.renewamerica.us/columns/darr/050110 ("[G]un 
control laws ... will erode the sense of independence and self reliance of regular 
people until they feel that they can do nothing that does not meet government 
approval.") . 
109 See joHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 115, 333-42 (1971). 
110 See id. 
Ill See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 195-202 (1986). 
112 See RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985); RoNALD DwoRKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977); joHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM, xvi-xviii 
(1993); RAWLS, supra note 109, at 363-65. For Rawls, these principles of justice limit-
ing the authority of the state are those that would have been consented to by rational 
actors in ignorance of many particular facts about themselves. But this is not a con-
sent theory of the Lockean form . The consent is hypothetical, not actual , and is not 
used to demonstrate that the individual in fact has a duty of obedience. It is instead a 
method of arriving at our considered intuitions about justice. 
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The best argument available is to point to other interests com-
monly thought of as fundamental that themselves appear tied to the 
executive right. Consider the right of a civil plaintiff to bring a law-
suit. This right is often described as protecting certain participatory 
interests, interests that are independent of the truth-seeking function 
of the trial. 113 But by respecting these interests, we have recreated 
some of the inconveniences of the state of nature. By bringing a law-
suit and compelling the defendant to bear the burdens of a response, 
the plaintiff is allowed to exact a penalty upon someone she believes 
has violated her rights, despite the fact that she will tend to interpret 
the scope of her rights in her favor. Indeed, the result can be feuding: 
A, perceiving her rights to have been violated, will sue B, an act which 
B will perceive as a violation of his rights, motivating him to retaliate 
by counterclaiming against A. 114 
To be sure, these participatory rights are reined in, most notably 
by limits-largely weak and underenforced-on frivolous litigation.1I 5 
But why do they exist at all? Can't one argue that they are contrary to 
the very purpose of governmental authority? Mter all, one has a duty 
to submit to such authority because of the conflict that results when 
people engage in private enforcement. Why would one have a funda-
mental interest in engaging in the very activity that the government is 
meant to end? Why shouldn't the government have the authority to 
fully control rights enforcement? Why do civil lawsuits exist? An 
answer is that individuals have a fundamental interest in the protec-
tion, to some extent, of Lockean values of autonomy and individual-
ism. This is something that even those who reject consent theories of 
political obligation can accept. 
The same point can be made concerning the participatory rights 
of criminal defendants. Consider the argument that the privilege 
against self-incrimination "rebukes government when, by omission or 
113 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural]ustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 273-305 
(2004). 
114 Benjamin Zipursky has recently offered an account of private law as involving a 
partial alienation to the state of the rights that one possesses in the state of nature. 
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF 
juRISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 631-32 Uules Colemen & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). One's alienation is partial insofar as one retains a right of action, which one 
can exercise, at one's discretion, through the court system. One's natural right to 
redress is channeled through the state. /d. at 632-36; see also john C.P. Goldberg, The 
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of 
Wrongs, 115 YALE LJ. 524, 541-44 (2005) ("In sum, Locke's social contract theory 
claims that victims of wrongs possess a natural right to reparations from wrongdoers 
and that government ... owes it to them to provide a law of reparations."). 
115 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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commission, it inhibits, stultifies, or interrupts the process by which 
the accused decides what to do about whatever criminal responsibility 
rests at his doorstep."116 This popular argument for the privilege 
seems in conflict with the very idea of governmental authority. The 
whole point of the state is to keep the individual from relying on his 
own judgment about his wrongdoing. To the extent that he relies on 
his own judgment, he will read the scope of rights and duties in his 
favor. Allowing a criminal defendant to frustrate the government's 
investigation, simply on the ground that he believes he has done noth-
ing wrong, sounds anarchistic.ll 7 It recreates the very conflict that 
government was meant to end. The existence of governmental obliga-
tion should, it seems, carry with it an obligation to participate in its 
investigation into one's own wrongdoing. Why then is the privilege 
thought to go "to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to 
the state"? 118 The answer, once again, is that it is a limited protection 
of Lockean values of autonomy and individualism. 
The same argument can be used to justify an individual right to 
bear arms. Granted, private arms possession tends to increase the 
costs of mistaken judgments about the scope of one's rights. But the 
right to initiate civil lawsuits and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion have similar costs. In each case, we preserve some of the entitle-
ment that we possessed in the state of nature, out of respect for 
individual autonomy. 
4. A Thought Experiment 
Admittedly, not everyone sees firearm possession as having the 
symbolic significance of participatory rights at trial. But I believe that 
most of us are committed to the idea that we have a fundamental 
interest in some sort of capacity to engage in violent defense of what 
we perceive to be our rights-an interest that is in tension with the 
very idea of the authority of the state. There is a point at which gov-
ernmental interference in this capacity will seem impermissible. 
That most of us have such intuitions can be revealed by the fol-
lowing thought experiment: Imagine that people have the capacity to 
116 Thomas S. Schrock et al., Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 49 (1978). 
117 See Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The P1ivilege Against 
Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DuKE LJ. 113, 133-56 (2002) 
[hereinafter Green, Paradox]; Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 627 
( 1999) [hereinafter Green, Last Stand]. 
ll8 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas,J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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throw a punch or engage in similar violent acts-whether in aggres-
sion or self-defense-only because of the presence of a naturally 
occurring substance in drinking water. (The substance does not gen-
erate the intention to act violently, but simply allows one to carry out 
the intention physically.) This substance has always been present, 
which is why we always assumed we were biologically capable of vio-
lence. But it can easily be removed. Is it within the government's 
authority to do so? 
I believe that most of us would say no. The reason is not that the 
government would be interfering with our right against bodily inter-
ference. The government would not be introducing a substance into 
our bodies that makes us passive. It would merely keep a substance 
from entering our bodies that allows us to act violently. Nor can the 
reason be that the ability to punch makes us safer. It is entirely possi-
ble that we would be safer-and our rights more secure-if we lacked 
this ability. The reason, it seems, is that losing this ability means los-
ing some of our autonomy, because it would limit our capacity to pro-
tect and vindicate our rights as we see fit. We would experience it as a 
humiliating subordination to the state, even though we know that the 
authority of the state exists precisely to limit our capacity to vindicate 
rights as we see fit. In short, we would describe it exactly the way Sec-
ond Amendment advocates describe disarmament. 
The difference between Second Amendment advocates and their 
opponents, it seems, is that the former have the attitude toward guns 
that the latter have toward their fists. Both attitudes are in tension 
with the very idea of governmental authority. It should not be incon-
ceivable, therefore, even to those who fail to see the powerful sym-
bolic value of guns, that an individual right to bear arms might have 
been enshrined in the United States Constitution. 
Notice that this justification is able to identify the special value of 
guns that makes them worthy of protection. The problem with dis-
armament is not that it restricts our liberty to do what we want. Any 
law does that. Guns are special because they allow us to defend our 
vision of our rights. Because they are connected to our status as moral 
agents, our autonomy is more profoundly violated by disarmament 
than by misappropriation of our other property. 
5. Problems of Scope 
Although the fourth justification captures common intuitions in 
favor of the Second Amendment, it makes determining the scope of 
the Amendment very difficult. The scope of provisions in the Bill of 
Rights is commonly determined by reference to the autonomy interest 
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that is protected. I I 9 And the nature and strength of this interest is a 
matter about which courts usually have robust intuitions. 
Things are more difficult with the Second Amendment. A court 
might have a fairly clear view about the scope of the natural right to 
bear arms. But the Second Amendment cannot conceivably protect 
the entire natural right. The problem is not merely that we would be 
allowed to own machine guns. The natural right to bear arms is tied 
to our natural executive right. If the entire right were protected, we 
would have the right to be Charles Bronson: we would be allowed to 
bypass the criminal justice system and use our guns to hunt down and 
kill someone we suspected to have murdered a family member. We 
could not be punished for our actions, as long as we were in the end 
right about who the murderer was. 
The Second Amendment must protect something significantly 
less than the natural right, just as the right to duel protects something 
less than the natural executive right. And, like the right to duel, the 
scope of the right to bear arms will largely be determined by symbolic 
considerations. 120 Only arms that are the symbolic embodiments of 
Lockean autonomy and individualism would be protected. 
Curiously, the fourth justification could give some support to the 
Miller test advocated by Scalia in Heller. 121 A type of arms is unlikely to 
play a symbolic role if it is not typically owned by the population. 
Likewise, the protected use of arms might be limited to typical use-
most notably legally permissible self-defense. It would not extend to 
the vigilantism that is allowed in the state of nature. 
E. Anarchism 
The next justification (our fifth) does not claim that the use of 
arms in private self-defense is a fundamental interest that limits the 
authority of the state. It is not a condition for governmental authority 
that citizens are allowed to possess arms-the way it is a condition that 
they are allowed to engage in free speech or that cruel and unusual 
punishments are not imposed. Instead, the fifth justification is 
anarchistic: the natural right to. bear arms in self-defense is returned 
119 The scope of the Fourth Amendment, for example, is determined by reference 
to individuals' privacy interests. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
654-57 (1995). 
120 This is comparable to the difficulty that courts have found determining the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Green, Para-
dox, supra note 117, at 149-56. 
121 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
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to individuals because they have escaped from the authority of the 
state. They are in the state of nature. 
1. The Government Has Failed to Provide Sufficient Personal 
Security 
Under one example of this justification, we have returned to the 
state of nature because the government is not providing us with suffi-
cient personal security. The inadequacy of police protection returns 
to us our natural right to bear arms, whether or not a system of private 
arms possession makes us safer. 
This justification is easily confused with the first, which appeals to 
the public safety benefits of private arms possession. When we imag-
ine the government failing to satisfY its obligations to protect citizens 
from violence-that is, a situation in which the fifth justification is 
applicable-we are likely imagining a scenario in which it is incompe-
tent at disarming criminals. If so, the first justification might also 
apply: since criminals are armed, the primary effect of a policy of dis-
armament might be a decrease in the use of arms in justified self-
defense. 
But the two justifications are distinguishable. Assume that the 
government is meeting its obligation to provide a minimal level of 
security from violence, for example, because a policeman is stationed 
on every block. If so, the fifth justification cannot apply. But if the 
government is nevertheless incompetent at disarming criminals, the 
first justification might still apply. These relatively well-protected citi-
zens might be made still safer by private arms possession, and this fact 
might put disarmament beyond the government's authority. 
Conversely, assume that the first justification does not apply. Pri-
vate arms possession does not make people safer. Indeed, let us imag-
ine that the government has successfully disarmed the entire 
population, including criminals, and it cannot allow the law-abiding 
access to guns without too many criminals rearming themselves as 
well. But in other respects the government is doing a bad job of pro-
tecting citizens from violence. Unarmed criminals (or criminals 
armed with knives) roam at will. If this is the case, the fifth justifica-
tion could still apply. The government's violation of citizens' funda-
mental interest in a minimal level of security from violence might 
return to them their natural right to bear arms. 
To be sure, it need not follow from the fact that the government 
is failing to abide by one of its obligations that citizens enter the state 
of nature entirely and regain all of their natural rights. It does not 
follow from the fact that the government has violated one's right to 
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free speech, for example, that one can refuse to abide by its resolution 
of an unrelated contract dispute. 122 But it certainly seems possible 
that the government's failure to abide by its obligation to provide suf-
ficient personal security would return to citizens their natural right to 
bear arms. Mter all, the government's failure to protect citizens from 
violence returns to them some of their executive right. They may 
engage in acts that would normally be reserved for the police alone. 
And the right to bear arms, as we have seen, is tied to this executive 
right. 
It might appear odd that the fact that citizens are vulnerable to 
violence would give them the right to something that would make the 
level of violence even worse. Keep in mind, however, that we are 
assuming that the choice to arm dominates, in the sense that it makes 
one safer compared to a fixed population. The government seeks to 
disarm the population because it has concluded that when everyone 
makes this choice, we are all less safe. By abiding by the law compel-
ling disarmament, therefore, one is disadvantaging oneself in order to 
contribute to the creation of a public good. And it is arguable that 
one would no longer have an obligation to contribute if the govern-
ment is failing to provide a minimal level of security. In such situa-
tions one may choose the dominant strategy. Every man, as they say, 
for himself. 
Whether those who reject consent theories of the state would 
come to the same conclusion is less certain. To be sure, they too 
would likely understand the government as obligated to provide citi-
zens with a minimal level of security from violence. Furthermore, if 
the government failed to meet this obligation, citizens would surely be 
permitted to take protection into their own hands to some extent. 
But it is more questionable whether they would also be freed of their 
obligation to obey laws disarming the population (assuming, as we 
are, that such laws make the population safer). A natural duty of 
political obedience-a duty independent of our consent-is arguably 
tied to an obligation to participate in the creation of public goods. 123 
Let us assume, however, that the violation of our fundamental 
interest in security does allow us to bear arms. The fifth justification 
still suffers from its anarchistic premises. If one is worried that the 
122 What we need is a theory regarding which natural rights are returned to indi-
viduals when the government fails to satisfY some of its obligations, an issue which 
Locke does not adequately explore. This question would presumably have to be 
answered by reference to one's obligations in the state of nature when another party 
to an agreement has committed a limited breach. 
123 See joHN RAWLS, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, reprinted in jOHN 
RAWLS 117, 121-28 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
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government will be unwilling to spend the resources necessary to pro-
vide its citizens with a minimal level of security from violence, the solu-
tion would apparently not be a constitutional right to bear arms, but a 
constitutional right to police protection. 
But perhaps the government can anticipate that it will be unable 
to provide citizens with the requisite level of protection. The court of 
appeals in Heller suggested that this might have been true of the 
United States at the time of the Founding: "[M] ost Americans lacked 
a professional police force until the middle of the nineteenth century 
and ... many Americans lived in backcountry such as the Northwest 
Territory."124 The Founders, recognizing that these citizens were in 
the state of nature to an extent, might have concluded that they 
regained their natural right to bear arms. 125 
Notice that the Founders could have concluded that these citi-
zens were in the state of nature only in some respects. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that they would consider these citizens to be in the state of 
nature as far as the adjudication of rights violations was concerned, 
since they must have thought they were offering citizens adequate 
lawmakers and courts. 126 Once a citizen apprehended a suspected 
violator of the law, he would be obligated to turn the suspect over to 
the government to try and punish. 
But they might have concluded that citizens were in the state of 
nature concerning many of the activities now provided by a police 
force. In particular, citizens would have to rely on themselves for pro-
tection against lawless violence and for apprehending suspected viola-
tors of the law. Since they were in the state of nature in these areas, 
they might regain their natural right to bear arms. 
It is worth emphasizing once again that under this justification 
the right to bear arms is not a limit on governmental authority. A 
government may permissibly disarm its citizens if it is providing suffi-
cient police protection. And one problem with the fifth justification is 
that our current government appears to be providing such protection. 
No one currently lives in conditions similar to the backcountry at the 
time of the Founding. Although police protection is not what we 
124 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 383 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
125 Of course, the fact that individuals in the backcountry are without police pro-
tection might also suggest that the first justification applies. Under such circum-
stances, the government could not credibly claim to be able to disarm criminals. For 
this reason, a system of disarmament might make the public less safe, because its 
effect would primarily be on the law-abiding. 
126 See U.S. CaNST. arts. I, III. 
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might hope it would be, it is hard to argue that it is so inadequate that 
we have returned to the state of nature. 
Another problem with the fifth justification is the scope of the 
Second Amendment. If the government's failure to provide sufficient 
security returns to individuals their entire right to bear arms, the Sec-
ond Amendment would protect machine guns. Furthermore, the 
Amendment would appear to extend beyond arms possession to other 
rights that would be possessed by those in the backcountry at the time 
of the Founding, such as the right to identify and detain suspected 
violators of the law (provided that these suspects were turned over for 
adjudication to the government). The Second Amendment would 
protect a right to form a posse. 
2. State-of-Nature Pockets 
Another less plausible version of the fifth justification does not 
assume that the government is doing a bad job providing security. It 
is instead based on the idea that we are released from the authority of 
the government when faced with imminent violence-that is, in cir-
cumstances where we are threatened and the government cannot 
come to our aid. No matter how many resources are devoted to law 
enforcement, such situations will arise. Since imminent violence 
releases us from governmental authority, we regain our natural right 
to bear arms. 
The argument, once again, is not that we have a right to bear 
arms because they make us safer in these state-of-nature pockets. A 
system of private arms possession, we can assume, makes us less safe by 
increasing the likelihood that aggressors will be armed. Rather, we 
have a right to bear arms-with any reduction in safety that results-
because we return to the state of nature when faced with imminent 
violence. 
Many Second Amendment advocates appear to endorse this the-
ory given the frequency with which they quote the following passage 
from Locke's Second Treatise: 
Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for 
having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill when he sets on me to 
rob me but of my horse or coat, because the law, which was made 
for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life 
from present force, which if lost is capable of no reparation, permits 
me my own defence and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggres-
sor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common 
judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the 
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mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with author-
ity puts all men in a state of Nature .... 127 
Since, they argue, we are in the state of nature in such cases, the gov-
ernment cannot forbid us from bearing arms for our defense. 128 
One problem with this justification is that the mere fact that citi-
zens might find themselves in a state-of-nature pocket does not mean 
that the government is obligated to allow them to bear arms now, 
when they are not in a pocket. They might have a right to bear arms 
within the pocket-a right that would allow them, like MacGyver, to 
fashion arms on the spot to deal with the threat. But it is unclear why 
the government has to provide them with a right to bear arms in antic-
ipation that they might find themselves in a pocket. 129 
More fundamentally, Locke was wrong to conclude that citizens 
confronted with imminent violence return to the state of nature. 
Locke came to this conclusion because they were apparently able to 
exercise the executive right that they had alienated upon entering 
into the social contract. They could take the enforcement of their 
rights into their own hands. This made it look as if they had returned 
to the state of nature. But individuals have a right to self-defense 
when confronted with imminent violence, not because the govern-
ment has lost authority over them in these cases, but because if the 
government wishes to retain its authority over them, it must allow 
them to engage in certain acts of self-defense. 
As we have seen, there are plausible arguments that the govern-
ment must allow individuals to engage in self-defense in cases of immi-
nent violence. One reason is excuse. Because we would engage in 
self-defense even if it were prohibited, we may not permissibly be pun-
ished by the government for defending ourselves. 130 Another is that 
laws permitting self-defense manifestly promote public safety. 131 But 
these arguments do not presume that individuals reenter the state of 
nature in cases of imminent violence and so regain all or some of 
their natural rights. They merely claim that certain acts of self-
defense must be permitted by the government if it is to remain within 
its authority. This is no different from other arguments that the gov-
127 LocKE, supra note 23, § 19, at 16-17. 
128 See, e.g., David C. Savino, Self-Defense and the Right to Bear Arms: A Historical 
Examination and Analysis of These Populist Rights (May 3, 1999), http:/ /www.talon 
site.com/armory/ Articles%5CpapSelfDefense_and.htm; Gary A. Shade, The Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms: The Legacy of Republicanism vs. Absolutism Qan. 10, 1993), 
http:/ /www.firearmsandliberty.com/militia_.htm. 
129 See Heyman, supra note 101, at 245-46. 
130 See supra Part LB. 
131 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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ernment must respect citizens' fundamental interests. No one would 
claim, for example, that individuals are in the state of nature when 
speaking simply because the government must respect their funda-
mental interest in free speech. 
Indeed, Locke could not have really believed that one reenters 
the state of nature when confronted with imminent violence, for he 
insisted that self-defense may be "regulated by laws made by the soci-
ety."132 The fact that Locke thought that the government may apply 
its laws to someone confronted with imminent violence and adjudi-
cate after the event whether his actions conformed to those laws is 
incompatible with the belief that these situations occur in the state of 
nature. 
II. JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON REvoLUTION AGAINST TYRANNY 
Up to this point we have considered arguments for the Second 
Amendment, of various degrees of plausibility, that look to the use of 
arms in personal self-defense. That the Second Amendment protects 
bearing arms for this purpose was essential to Scalia's opinion in Hel-
ler.133 But he also acknowledged that the Founders contemplated that 
private arms possession would be beneficial because an armed citi-
zenry can rise up against a tyrant. 134 The sixth through the eighth 
justifications concern this idea. 
A. Discouraging Tyrannical Minorities 
Under the previous five justifications, the Second Amendment 
protects an interest that individuals have against the majority. Under 
the sixth justification, in contrast, the Second Amendment protects 
the will of the majority, by increasing its power to revolt if a tyrannical 
minority should arise. 135 In a sense, this justification treats the Second 
Amendment as a "collective," not an "individual," right. To be sure, 
the Second Amendment does not protect state governments' interest 
in arming organized militias. It gives each person a right to bear 
arms. But the right is collective in the sense that it exists to protect 
132 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 129, at 71. 
133 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-22 (2008). 
134 See id. at 2806-07. 
135 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL or RIGHTS 47-49 (1998); Levinson, supra note 4, 
at 649; Brent]. Mcintosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REv. 673, 
679-81 (2000); Jacob G. Hornberger, The Future of Freedom Found., The Revolu-
tionary Second Amendment Quly 2000), http:/ /www.fff.org/freedom/0700a.asp 
("[T]he right to bear arms protected by the Second Amendment is the best insurance 
policy that the American people could have against tyranny."). 
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the majority's power, rather than to protect interests that individuals 
have against the majority. The Second Amendment is like the right to 
vote, protecting and enabling democracy, rather than limiting the 
power of democratic institutions. 136 
The sixth justification is able to explain the feeling that private 
arms possession has value even if it increases violence. Security 
against tyranny may be worth that cost. But is it able to generate a 
story about why this value should be constitutionally protected? H pri-
vate arms possession is in the majority's interest, why protect it with a 
countermajoritarian constitutional right, that is, a right that is able to 
strike down democratically enacted legislation? That the Fourth and 
Eighth Amendments should be countermajoritarian in their legal 
effect makes sense, given that they protect interests that individuals 
have against the majority, and we have reason to believe that the 
majority might sacrifice these interests improperly. But if the Second 
Amendment is meant to benefit the majority, why should it constrain 
the majority's will? If the majority wants to sacrifice its own interests 
by disarming the population, why shouldn't it be able to? 
One possibility is that the majority's authority is limited by an 
obligation not to create an excessive risk of losing its power to a tyrant. 
If so, the Second Amendment would enforce this limit against the 
temptations that the majority would have to disarm the population in 
the interest of public safety. 
The idea that it is beyond the majority's authority to endanger its 
own power is not inconceivable. Locke, however, appeared to believe 
that there were no limits on the type of government to which the 
majority can entrust its authority. 137 It could entrust its powers to a 
136 To say that the right to vote exists to protect democracy does not mean that 
one cannot also understand it as protecting individuals' autonomy interests in politi-
cal participation. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 
336 n.24 (1993). 
Under some interpretations, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
protects democracy as well. To be sure, some understand the Clause as protecting 
individuals' autonomy interest in expressing their ideas, an interest that they possess 
against the majority. See, e.g., Richards, Obscenity Law, supra note 50, at 61-67; Rich-
ards, Toleration, supra note 50, at 331, 334. But some see the Clause as preventing a 
captured government from subverting the will of the majority by limiting the informa-
tion available to voters. The Clause addresses this problem by allowing citizens to 
expose the government's misdeeds and by giving voters the information they need to 
come to informed decisions. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDOM 54-60 
(Greenwood Press 1979); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 
1977 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 521, 554-67. 
137 Provided that the government does not violate the reserved rights of 
individuals. 
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monarchy, 138 for example, even though he recognized that, in so 
doing, the majority exposed itself to a serious risk of tyranny. 139 It 
would appear, therefore, that for Locke the majority is free to accept 
the risk of tyranny that results from a disarmed population. 
But even if the choice to disarm is within the majority's authority, 
the Second Amendment could be understood as an act of prudential 
self-limitation on the majority's part. Because private arms possession 
makes us more vulnerable to violence, at some time in the future the 
majority may imprudently disarm the population, wrongly privileging 
public safety over protection against tyranny. The Second Amend-
ment helps keep this from happening. 
Another possibility is that the Second Amendment exists not to 
keep the majority from making imprudent sacrifices, but to keep a 
nascent tyrant-acting through a captured legislature-from disarm-
ing the population in order to secure his power.140 Indeed, since the 
passage of laws disarming the population could be a sign that capture 
is occurring, the Second Amendment might also play an evidentiary 
role. The violation of Second Amendment rights will indicate to the 
majority that it needs to exercise greater control over the government. 
In addition to being able to generate a plausible story about why 
the value of private arms possession would need to be protected by a 
constitutional right, the empirical premises standing behind the sixth 
justification are relatively plausible and stable. 141 The relationship 
between an armed population and a successful popular revolution is 
fairly straightforward. Since the tyrannical government will be armed, 
allowing private arms possession clearly increases the power of the 
majority compared to the government and makes the majority better 
138 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 132-33, at 72-73; see also RuTH W. GRANT, joHN 
LocKE's LIBERALISM 117-19 (1987) ("[In Locke's view] the majority ... may decide 
that fewer than a majority, even one man and his heirs forever, will rule that commu-
nity."); THoMAS, supra note 80, at 27 (stating that in Locke's view, constitutional mon-
archy is an acceptable form of government to which the people can entrust power). 
139 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 94, at 53-54. 
140 See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CoNSTITU-
TIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 230-38 Qon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
141 This is not to say that its empirical premises cannot be criticized. One might 
argue, for example, that if a tyrant does arise, small arms of the sort that would be 
allowed under any acceptable reading of the scope of the Amendment would provide 
insufficient powers of resistance (although they would surely increase the cost of tyr-
anny to some extent ) . See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and 
Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 
YALE LJ. 661, 665 (1989). One could also argue that the likelihood that a tyrannical 
regime will arise is too small to justify the costs of widespread arms possession. See 
Bellesiles, supra note 103, at 250. 
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able to enforce its will. Furthermore, this fact does not depend signifi-
cantly on the current legal regulation of arms. One problem with the 
first justification, it will be remembered, was that if private arms pos-
session made us safer, it was only in the context of a particular legal 
system that was largely effective (or utterly ineffective) at keeping 
arms out of the hands of criminals. 142 But arms can discourage tyr-
anny no matter how they are legally regulated, provided that they are 
in the hands of a sufficiently large number of people. Legal regula-
tion is irrelevant to this beneficial effect because the use of arms to 
overthrow tyranny occurs outside of the legal system, during a 
revolution. 
But under the sixth justification, the Second Amendment's scope 
would be determined by the majority's interest in avoiding tyranny. 
And this would make it much narrower than most Second Amend-
ment advocates would wish. 143 Apparently only three acts would be 
protected: (1) ownership of arms (such that they will be available in 
the event of a revolution); (2) sufficient practice with them to make 
one reasonably effective should a revolution arise; and (3) use of arms 
in an actual revolution against a tyrant. 144 
Most significantly, under the sixth justification, the use of arms 
for private self-defense would not be protected. For this reason, the 
law requiring all firearms to be trigger-locked, which was struck down 
in Heller, would be constitutional. There is nothing about such a law 
that would keep us from unlocking our guns in the event of a revolu-
tion. Furthermore, since the law in Heller allowed guns to be used for 
"lawful recreational purposes," 145 citizens would be able to develop 
sufficient facility with them to be effective revolutionaries. 
Scalia recognized the possibility of "a sort of middle position, 
whereby citizens were permitted to carry arms openly, unconnected 
with any service in a formal militia, but were given the right to use 
them only for the military purpose of banding together to oppose tyr-
anny."146 But, in addition to rejecting this reading of the Second 
142 See supra Part I.A.l. 
143 CJ. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 
26, 126-29 (2000) (arguing that the Second Amendment refers to a collective right of 
the people to render military service and that nothing in the Amendment prohibits 
the kinds of "reasonable gun control measures now on the national agenda"). 
144 Furthermore, a court is unlikely to find that an individual is engaged in the 
third type of act, since that would mean admitting that the government of the United 
States is tyrannical. 
145 D.C. CoDE§ 7-2507.02 (2001), invalidated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 
S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
146 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2809. 
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Amendment as "odd," he noted that that it was not one offered by the 
District of Columbia, which insisted that the Second Amendment 
extended only to the use of arms in an organized state militia.147 
(One wonders whether the District would have had greater success if 
it had argued for this middle position.) 
Which weapons would be protected under the sixth justification 
is uncertain. As we have seen, Scalia answered this question through 
the Miller test, which gives individuals a constitutionally protected 
interest only in arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes." 148 Although this excludes machine guns, it also 
divorces the scope of the Second Amendment from its underlying 
purposes. Mter all, machine guns would be useful in a revolution 
against a tyrannical regime, since the tyrant is likely to employ 
machine guns himself. A more principled solution to this problem 
would be to accept that individuals have a Second Amendment inter-
est in possessing machine guns, but to uphold laws prohibiting their 
possession through an application of the standard of review. 
It is worth noting that in certain respects the sixth justification 
could put greater burdens on the government, for it might have an 
affirmative obligation to create the conditions for individuals to join 
together as a popular armed force. This is similar to the difference 
between a right to vote and a right to express one's views about the 
government. In one sense the right to vote is stronger, for it puts an 
obligation on the government to hold elections. The government has 
not respected this right simply by not interfering when people express 
their views about who should run the government. But the fact 
remains that under the sixth justification the Second Amendment 
would be weaker in a way that is unsatisfactory to Scalia and most Sec-
ond Amendment advocates, in not protecting individuals' interest in 
the private use of arms for self-defense. 149 
B. Discouraging Tyrannical Majorities 
Sometimes Second Amendment advocates argue not that an 
armed citizenry helps protect the majority against a tyrannical minor-
ity, but that it helps ensure that the majority will respect the funda-
147 /d. 
148 /d.at2816. 
149 See Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment As an "Underenforced 
Constitutional Norm, "21 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 719, 730 (1998); Lund, supra note 4, 
at 31 n.72. 
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mental rights of individuals or minorities. 150 This theory does not 
assume that arms possession is justified because the majority is actually 
violating the limits on its authority. Private arms possession is valuable 
because it makes the violation of these limits less likely. This point is 
important because there is an independent argument for a right to 
bear arms if the government is actually violating fundamental rights. 
According to that argument, for example, Jews in Nazi Germany, 
unlike German citizens whose fundamental interests were respected, 
would have a right to bear arms-although not one that would likely 
have been recognized by the Nazi government. We shall explore such 
an argument later. Our current theory, in contrast, is that citizens 
should be allowed arms, even though their fundamental rights are not 
actually being violated, because arms make it less likely that their fun-
damental rights will be violated. 
Those who offer such arguments do not always make it clear 
whether arms possession is itself a fundamental right of individuals. It 
would be a fundamental right only if individuals do not merely have 
primary fundamental rights, but also a secondary fundamental right 
to a certain level of protection against the risk of governmental viola-
tions of their primary rights. But it is unclear that there is such a right 
or that it would be strong enough to demand, not merely constitu-
tional rights (like the Fourth or Eighth Amendment) that directly pro-
tect primary fundamental rights, but also a constitutional right to 
arms possession as a further inducement to the majority to respect 
primary rights. 151 
Like the sixth justification, the seventh is able to explain why pri-
vate arms possession is valuable even if public safety is decreased. 
Encouraging the majority to stay within the limits of its authority may 
be worth an increase in gun violence between citizens. But the sev-
enth justification has weaknesses to which the sixth is not subject. 
One problem is that it is not clear that arming the population 
would make an individual better off when faced with a hostile major-
150 See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: 
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. LJ. 309, 349-58 (1991); Daniel D. 
Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1237 
(1997). 
151 Even if there is no fundamental right to private arms possession, the counter-
majoritarian legal effect of the Second Amendment could be explained as a strategy 
of precommitment on the part of the majority. Because private arms possession 
increases the level and cost of violence between citizens, the majority \viii be inclined 
to disarm the population, even though this will increase its own tendency to violate 
the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities. The Second Amendment keeps 
the majority from making this imprudent choice. 
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ity. It is true that his powers of resistance against the government 
would be strengthened. An armed individual has greater powers of 
resistance against an armed government than an unarmed individual 
does. But since we are assuming that the government is acting with 
the blessing of the majority, arming the population will create a new 
oppressor-an armed majority of private citizens. 152 
1. Will Allowing Individuals to Vindicate Their Visions of Reserved 
Rights Make It More Likely That Reserved Rights Are 
Respected? 
The seventh justification is suspect for another reason. There is 
no assurance that when an individual uses arms to resist the majority 
his resistance is justified. Arming him allows him to resist the majority 
even when no fundamental right has in fact been violated. The sev-
enth justification appears to presume that allowing individuals to use 
arms to enforce their vision of the limits of the majority's authority 
will increase the likelihood that the actual limits will be respected. 
This presumption is not merely questionable, it is also contrary to 
a core intuition of Lockean political theory (a serious problem to the 
extent that we are relying on such a theory to justify the Second 
Amendment). Individuals are motivated to join the social contract 
because of the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. 153 Because we 
are fallible judges about whether natural rights have been violated-
and particularly because we tend to interpret our own rights and the 
rights of our kin too broadly154-we can make mistakes, particularly in 
our application of the principles of natural law to the facts. 155 As a 
result, the state of nature can devolve into a state of war. 
If this Lockean intuition is correct, an individual's views about the 
limits of the majority's authority would also be biased in his favor. 
There is no reason, therefore, to assume that empowering the individ-
152 See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365, 1373-74 
( 1993); David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the 
Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TuL. L. REv. 387, 463 (1999) 
("[Minorities] should ... fear a regime of decentralized violence because they are 
relatively weak and powerless; they do not have as many guns as their enemies."). 
153 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 124-27, at 70-71. 
154 !d. § 13, at 13, § 125, at 70. 
155 !d. § 124, at 70 ("[T]hough the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want 
of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it 
to their particular cases."); see also id. § 136, at 76 (" [T] he law of Nature being unwrit-
ten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men ... who, through passion or 
interest, shall miscite or misapply it .... "). 
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ual to enforce his views about the limits of the majority's authority will 
make it more likely that the actual limits will be respected. Indeed, 
because an individual's views will be biased in his favor, his views will 
diverge from other individuals' just as much as they will diverge from 
the m~ority's. Some individuals may think that a graduated income 
tax is outside the government's authority. Others may think a flat tax 
is. Empowering individuals to enforce their diverging views about the 
limits of governmental authority will simply recreate the chaos of the 
state of nature. 
What is more, if the assumption of the seventh justification were 
correct, there would apparently be no reason for individuals to leave 
the state of nature and enter into the social contract in the first place. 
The problem with the state of nature is that individuals are empow-
ered to enforce their diverging views about natural rights, resulting in 
feuding. If their views are likely to be correct, they will not diverge. 
Our skepticism about the seventh justification is supported by 
Locke's own statements about individuals' resistance against a major-
ity that they believe has violated their reserved rights. Locke accepted 
that individuals whose reserved rights are actually violated by the 
majority have a right of resistance. 156 They return to the state of 
nature and may exercise their natural right to defend their rights. He 
was sensitive, however, to the problem of individuals wrongly resisting 
the m~ority or its government. But he argued that the general recog-
nition of a right of individual resistance will not create serious disor-
der, since aggrieved individuals (whose resistance may or may not be 
justified) cannot overcome the coercive power of the majority as a 
whole. 157 Implicit in this argument, however, is the recognition that 
giving individuals greater powers of resistance by arming them could 
156 At times Locke suggests that an individual may not legitimately resist the gov-
ernment at all. See id. §§ 87-88, at 49-50. Only the majority as a whole can. See id. 
§ 149, at 82-83, § 240, at 131, § 243, at 132; see also SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 172-74 
("The standard reading of the text seems to be that Locke's right of resistance can be 
held only by the body of people, its proper exercise to be determined only by the 
majority of the body politic."); THoMAS, supra note 80, at 70 (noting that according to 
Locke, "no one has a right to resist unless this single instance [of an individual's rights 
being violated] has persuaded the majority to withdraw its consent"). But Locke's 
considered view appears to be that individuals may engage in legitimate resistance 
even against a majority: "And where the body of the people, Many single man, are 
deprived of their right, or are under the exercise of a power without right, having no 
appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven, whenever they judge the 
cause of sufficient moment." LocKE, supra note 23, § 168, at 93 (emphasis added); see 
SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 174-77. 
157 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 208, at 112-13, § 230, at 123-24. 
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create serious disorder, with no increased chance that reserved rights 
will actually be respected. 158 
2. Blackstone on Auxiliary Rights 
The seventh justification appears to be supported by a frequently 
cited passage from William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, where he described the right to bear arms as an "auxiliary 
right," that is, a "barrier[ ] to protect and maintain inviolate ... pri-
mary rights." 159 But any reliance on Blackstone for the seventh justifi-
cation is misplaced, because he rejected the very idea of individual 
resistance to a majoritarian government. 16° For Blackstone, anyone 
who entered into the social contract (and so accepted the authority of 
the majority) was bound by its decisions. The majority's will, as 
expressed in the legislature, had an "absolute despotic power." 161 The 
only legitimate resistance to the government is by a majority as a 
whole. 162 Blackstone came to this conclusion precisely because of 
worries about the consequences of recognizing broader rights of indi-
vidual resistance. 
158 Locke may also have thought individual rights of resistance would not result in 
anarchy because disputes about the limits of the majority's authority would be far less 
frequent than were disputes about rights in the state of nature. Individuals are moti-
vated to enter into the social contract because of uncertainty about the scope of natu-
ral rights. This means that the social contract can be effective only if it is easier to 
determine one's rights and duties after having entered into the contract. A condition 
for the social contract, therefore, is that any limits on the authority of the majority 
must be matters of general (although not absolutely universal) agreement. And that 
suggests that the state of nature will not be reintroduced if individuals have rights of 
resistance. For there will be less disagreement about such matters than there were in 
the state of nature. 
This does not support the seventh justification, however. First of all, if the limits 
of the authority of the majority are something about which there is generally agree-
ment, the probability that the majority will fail to recognize these limits is lowered, 
making an armed citizenry less necessary. Second, even if disagreement about 
reserved rights is less frequent than disagreement about rights in the state of nature, 
the fact remains that when there is disagreement, there is no reason to believe that an 
individual's views will not be biased in his favor. As a result, there is still no good 
argument for empowering him to enforce this vision by giving him arms. 
159 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at*l41, *143; seealso]ovcE LEE MALcoLM, To KEEP 
AND BEAR ARMs 130 (1994) ("Blackstone's comments on [the need for citizens to be 
armed] are of the utmost importance since his work immediately became the great 
authority on English common law in both England and America."); Cottrol & Dia-
mond, supra note 150, at 322-23; Mcintosh, supra note 135, at 690. 
160 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *251. 
161 See id. at *260. 
162 See id. at *244. 
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To be sure, Blackstone spoke of personal security, personal lib-
erty, and private property as "absolute" constitutional rights, which 
suggests that he believed that the majority's authority is limited.163 
But he rejected the idea that violations of an individual's life, liberty, 
or property allow her to resist the majority. Unlike Locke, Blackstone 
worried that giving "every individual the right of ... employing private 
force to resist even private oppression" would be "productive of anar-
chy."164 Since he denied that individuals have rights against the 
majority, he could not have believed that private arms possession was a 
means of protecting such rights. 165 He must have understood the 
right to bear arms as facilitating majoritarian revolutions, along the 
lines envisioned by the sixth justification. 
Of course, one need not accept Blackstone's conclusion that the 
majority has no limits on its authority. One can accept that a 
majoritarian government can act beyond its authority by violating 
reserved rights of individuals. In such cases, they will be justified in 
resisting, including by force of arms. But our question at this point is 
not the rights of those whose reserved rights are violated (that, as we 
shall see, is the eighth justification). Our question is which system is 
best designed to ensure that these rights are not violated. And we 
have as yet no good reason to think that empowering individuals to 
enforce their diverging visions of their reserved rights will do the job. 
But let us assume that the seventh justification is correct. The 
scope of the Second Amendment would be limited by its purpose. Pri-
vate arms possession would be protected only to the extent that it 
enables individuals to defend the limits of governmental authority. 
And this would make the scope of the Second Amendment very simi-
lar to its scope under the sixth justification. In particular, the class of 
protected acts would include only: (1) private possession of certain 
weapons, (2) practice sufficient to allow for facility in their use, and 
(3) actual use when a reserved right is violated. A law that required all 
guns to be trigger-locked, which was struck down in Heller, would 
surely be constitutional, since nothing about that law keeps guns from 
being unlocked in the event that reserved rights are violated. 
C. Anarchism 
Rather than arguing, as the seventh justification does, that private 
arms possession makes it less likely that the reserved rights of individu-
163 !d. at *129. 
164 !d. at *251. 
165 See Green, Paradox, supra note 117, at 128-32; Heyman, supra note 101, at 
252-60. 
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als will be violated, the eighth works on the assumption that these 
rights are being violated by the government right now. One advan-
tage of this justification is that it is conceivable that an individual 
whose reserved rights are violated by the government has a right to 
use arms when resisting the government, even when laws prohibiting 
arms possession promote public safety. Had the government retained 
its authority over her, it could compel her to disarm as a means of 
reducing violence between citizens. But because the government has 
violated her reserved rights (for example, in privacy, free expression, 
or freedom of religious belief), she is no longer obligated to partici-
pate in the creation of this public good. 
Notice it would not matter under the eighth justification-the 
way it did under the seventh-that private arms possession is not a 
good method of ensuring that reserved rights are respected. The 
eighth justification does not give individuals arms because they make 
it more likely that their reserved rights will be respected. It gives them 
arms because their reserved rights have in fact been violated. It may 
be true that when individuals are armed, disagreement about the 
scope of our rights will simply recreate the conflict that existed in the 
state of nature. But the point of the eighth justification is that citizens 
are in the state of nature. The government has returned them to the 
state of nature by violating their reserved rights. 166 The eighth justifi-
cation, like the fifth, is anarchistic. Individuals regain their natural 
right to bear arms, even though they might be worse off as a result, 
because they stand outside the government's authority. But the 
eighth justification, unlike the fifth, emphasizes individuals' natural 
right to use arms in resistance against the government, rather than in 
private self-defense. 
It is questionable, however, that governmental violation of a 
reserved right frees one of all obligations to the government, even 
under a Lockean theory of governmental authority. Assume, for 
example, that the government arbitrarily appropriates your property. 
Locke believed that this would violate your reserved rights. 167 And he 
166 To say that an individual has a right of armed resistance does not mean that he 
can shoot government officials at will. Locke insists that even those in the state of 
nature are subject to proportionality restrictions when their rights are violated. The 
right to punish is not a right to act "according to the passionate heats or boundless 
extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and 
conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression." LocKE, supra note 23, 
§ 8, at 10. The point is merely that, having returned to the state of nature, they would 
no longer be subject to laws prohibiting arms possession, even if these laws help bring 
about public safety. 
167 !d. § 138, at 77-78. 
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would certainly think that you would return to the state of nature with 
respect to that governmental action, and so-to some extent-would 
regain your executive right to defend your rights. You could resist the 
appropriation. But would you reenter the state of nature entirely? 
Could you, for example, refuse to respect the government's resolution 
of an unrelated contract suit? 168 If you do remain bound by the con-
tract judgment, you might also still be subject to a law, enacted by the 
government for public safety reasons, that disarmed the population. 
You could resist the appropriation of your property, but not by force 
of arms. 
But even if some violations of reserved rights would not allow one 
to bear arms, it seems clear that violation of reserved rights could 
eventually become so severe that one's resistance could be by force of 
arms. Once again, this would be true despite the fact that disarma-
ment makes us safer from violence at the hands of our fellow citizens. 
This could be accepted even by those who reject consent theories 
of political authority. Because they too take political authority to be 
limited, they would surely consider violation of these limits to justifY 
resistance to some extent. And when the violation becomes signifi-
cant enough, it could presumably be by force of arms. 
But because of its anarchistic premises, the eighth justification is 
implausible. The government may indeed be illegitimate. But it is 
unlikely that its illegitimacy would be accepted by those creating con-
stitutional rights. 169 If the Founders were worried that the govern-
168 This question would presumably have to be answered by reference to your obli-
gations in the state of nature when another party to an agreement has committed a 
minor breach. Does the breach release you of all obligations under the agreement or 
can you still be bound to an extent? 
169 I offer an argument that a Lockean would have to recognize that all citizens 
are potentially in the state of nature in Green, Paradox, supra note 117, at 119-28, 
168-73. My argument there considers who has authority to decide disagreements 
between the majority and individuals about whether the majority is acting within its 
authority. If the majority has the authority to decide such disagreements, then all 
limits on its authority evaporate. For even if it did not have authority, it would never-
theless have authority if it decided it had authority. For this reason , I argued that an 
individual can reenter the state of nature, and regain his right to bear arms, simply by 
challenging the authority of the majority, even if the individual is in fact subject to the 
social contract. Although at the time I found the argument persuasive, I admitted 
that its anarchistic consequences made it more a reductio ad absurdum of Lockean 
political theory than an argument for the Second Amendment. 
I no longer believe, however, that an individual escapes the political authority of 
the majority simply by challenging its authority. It is true that the individual and the 
majority are in the state of nature with respect to the question of the majority 's authority. 
But the majority is forced to recognize that they are in the state of nature only with 
respect to that issue. It does not follow that it must give the individual all the rights 
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ment will violate certain reserved rights, the proper response, surely, 
would be to create constitutional rights protecting them-not consti-
tutional rights that protect the powers individuals would have if those 
reserved rights were violated. 
Furthermore, the scope of the Amendment under the eighth jus-
tification would be absurdly broad. If it is really true that the govern-
ment is acting outside its authority, why don't individuals have the 
right to machine guns or nerve gas? Mter all, violation of reserved 
rights could be imagined that would free individuals even of their 
obligations to obey laws prohibiting these weapons. 
III. JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON HuNTING 
There is a final justification to consider. Private arms possession 
might be valuable because arms can be used in hunting, which is itself 
valuable not merely because it provides food for one's family, but also 
because it is an important form of recreation and the expression of a 
particular conception of the good life. Scalia himself mentions this 
possibility.170 
Once again, such a justification is able to explain why guns have 
value despite associated social costs. Individuals' interest in hunting 
might be worth protecting despite an increase in gun violence 
between citizens. But the justification is unlikely to explain the intu-
itions of many Second Amendment advocates that it protects a funda-
mental interest that limits the authority of the government. For it is 
difficult to see how it would be beyond the government's authority to 
outlaw hunting entirely. 
In any event, the scope of the Second Amendment under this 
justification would be narrow. The protected weapons (rifles and the 
like) and protected acts (hunting and practicing with arms sufficiently 
to be an effective hunter) would be much narrower than most Second 
Amendment advocates demand and would be insufficient to strike 
down the laws at issue in Heller. 171 
CoNCLUSION 
My goal in this Article has been to identify nine possible justifica-
tions for constitutionally protecting private arms possession, as a foun-
dation for principled reasoning about the Second Amendment. 
he would have if he were in the state of nature. I hope to explore these questions, 
with which I also struggled in Green, Last Stand, supra note 117, at 698-99, later. (I 
am indebted to Matthew Adler for prodding me to reconsider my earlier argument.) 
170 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810 (2008). 
171 !d. at 2863 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Discussions of the Amendment, by advocates and detractors alike, 
have been insufficiently sensitive to the differences between these jus-
tifications. I'd like to end by briefly summing up how these justifica-
tions can illuminate Scalia's opinion in Heller and suggesting how they 
might answer some unresolved questions of the Second Amendment's 
scope. 
In his opinion, Justice Scalia noted that one benefit of the Sec-
ond Amendment contemplated by the Founders was that it allows citi-
zens to "resist tyranny." 172 As we have seen, however, this justification 
is ambiguous. We might understand the Second Amendment as giv-
ing to citizens the full natural right to bear arms that they would have 
if the government actually were tyrannical. (This is the eighth justifica-
tion.) On the other hand, the Second Amendment might protect pri-
vate arms possession only to the extent that it makes tyranny less 
likely. Furthermore, we might understand the tyranny that is discour-
aged as a minority that ignores the will of the majority (the sixth justi-
fication) or as a majority that violates the reserved rights of individuals 
(the seventh justification). Since it is the most plausible of the three, 
my guess is that Scalia (and the Founders) had something like the 
sixth justification in mind. 
In any event, if we seek to explain the decision in Heller, we can-
not look to these three justifications, since they do not concern indi-
viduals' interest in using arms to defend themselves against fellow 
citizens.173 Although Scalia believed that protection against tyranny 
was the reason for the creation of the Second Amendment, he argues 
that the Amendment also protects the interest in the use of arms for 
self-defense. 174 
The justification from hunting (our ninth) need not detain us, of 
course, since it too cannot justify the result in Heller. This leaves us 
with the first five justifications. There is an important distinction here 
between the first justification, which appeals to the public safety bene-
fits of private arms possession, and the remaining four, which seek to 
identify an autonomy interest in bearing arms that would exist even if 
private arms possession made us less safe. 
It is likely that Scalia, and the Founders, were not thinking of the 
third justification, since it is very implausible. It is not clear that the 
physically disadvantaged have any interest in the equalizing character 
of arms possession, much less an interest that is strong enough to jus-
172 Id. at 2801 (majority opinion). 
173 See supra Parts II.A-C, III. 
174 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801. 
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tify a constitutional right that could limit the government's ability to 
protect citizens from armed violence.175 
The second justification is also implausible. This justification, it 
will be remembered, seeks to tie the right to bear arms to the excuse 
of self-defense. We should be excused for engaging in self-defense, 
because the desire to defend ourselves in cases of imminent violence 
is very strong-so strong that we would not be able to abide by a law 
prohibiting self-defense. It is therefore beyond the authority of the 
government to make self-defense illegal. But excuse cannot justify a 
right to bear arms. Individuals simply do not have an impulse to bear 
arms that is so strong that they could not abide by a law requiring 
them to disarm. Excuse gives us no reason, therefore, to think that it 
is not within the government's authority to disarm the population. 
The failure of the second justification is important because Scalia 
insisted that "the inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the Sec-
ond Amendment right." 176 To the extent that the right to self-defense 
is based on excuse, no connection between it and the right to bear 
arms can be found. 
That leaves us with the first, fourth, and fifth justifications. The 
first justification grounds the Second Amendment in citizens' interest 
in safety from violence, and it depends upon the empirical judgment 
that a system of private arms possession makes them safer than a pol-
icy of disarmament.177 But even if this judgment is true, the question 
remains why the authority of the government is thereby limited. We 
are commonly thought obligated to abide by governmental decisions 
that are mistaken, even if the decisions make us less safe. 
To be sure, a decision may be beyond the government's authority 
if it manifestly fails to promote public safety or if it results in the gov-
ernment's failure to provide even the minimal level of security that is 
every citizen's right. Indeed, a right of self-defense, different from the 
right based on excuse, might be justified on just these grounds. A law 
prohibiting self-defense would manifestly fail to promote public safety, 
so much so that any citizen who abided by such a law would likely be 
less safe than in the state of nature. 
But one cannot use the same reasoning to justify a right to bear 
arms. Even if it is true that disarmament makes people less safe, it is 
not manifestly true. Reasonable people disagree on the matter. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that a government that compromises its 
citizens' safety through disarmament could not still provide them with 
175 See supra Part I.C. 
176 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
177 See supra Part I.A. I. 
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the minimal level of safety that is their rightP8 Once again, we have 
failed to find the connection Scalia insists upon between the right to 
bear arms and the right of self-defense. 
In any event, if the first justification does stand behind the Sec-
ond Amendment, the arguments for a strict scrutiny standard of 
review and for incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment would 
likely be weak. Although the Second Amendment seeks to protect 
individuals' powerful interest in safety, its strength cannot be identi-
fied with the strength of this interest. After all, those who seek to 
disarm the population are largely motivated by a desire to protect this 
same powerful interest. They believe that disarmament is the best · 
means of making people safe. According to the first justification, the 
Second Amendment constitutionalizes the empirical judgment that 
those who recommend disarmament are wrong. The strength of the 
right to bear arms should be tied therefore to the strength of this 
empirical judgment. 
The more plausible justifications are the fourth and fifth. These 
also see a connection between the right to bear arms and a right of 
self-defense. But the relevant right of self-defense is the natural exec-
utive right-that is, the right that each person possesses in the state of 
nature to enforce natural rights as she sees fit (and face the conse-
quences if she is wrong). For the Lockean, individuals possess such a 
right in the state of nature, even though their tendency to make mis-
takes results in feuding and an increase in natural rights violations. 
A natural right to bear arms can be derived from this right of self-
defense, because arms allow us to more effectively exercise our execu-
tive right. Insofar as they seek to derive the right to bear arms from 
the natural executive right, therefore, the fourth and fifth justifica-
tions can explain the connection that Scalia sees between the Second 
Amendment and a natural right of self-defense. 
The problem each must face, however, is that the very purpose of 
governmental authority is to end individuals' power of private rights 
enforcement. Just as one alienates the executive right upon entering 
the social contract, so, it seems, one would alienate the natural right 
to bear arms. We have as yet no explanation of why the natural right 
to bear arms would limit the authority of the government. 
The fifth justification solves this problem by arguing that the nat-
ural right to bear arms has been returned to us because the govern-
ment has failed to abide by its obligation to provide us with sufficient 
personal security. In short, the justification is anarchistic. The Sec-
178 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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ond Amendment exists because the government recognizes that we 
are (partially) in the state of nature. 
One problem with the fifth justification is this anarchistic pre-
mise. Even if it was true at the time of the Founding that many citi-
zens were within the state of nature, this is unlikely to be true now. 
Furthermore, insofar as the fifth justification apparently returns to 
individuals their entire natural right to bear arms, it would have prob-
lematic consequences for the Second Amendment's scope. Possession 
of machine guns would be protected. 
But if the fifth justification is correct, individuals' interests in 
arms possession would probably be significant enough to justify incor-
poration into the Fourteenth Amendment. What is more, laws that 
infringe upon Second Amendment interests would require strict scru-
tiny. Indeed, it is not clear why such laws would not simply be per se 
invalid. Given that individuals have a right to bear arms because they 
have escaped governmental authority, it is hard to see how the govern-
ment could have any power to compromise this right, even if the gov-
ernmental interest at issue were compelling and the law narrowly 
tailored to serve this interest. 
In the end, I find the fourth justification to be the most plausible 
account of the right to bear arms identified by Scalia in Heller. This 
justification does not assume that we have a natural right to bear arms 
because we have escaped the authority of the government. Instead, it 
argues that individuals retained part of the natural right to bear arms 
upon entering into the social contract, out of respect for Lockean val-
ues of autonomy and individualism. The Second Amendment is like 
those other limitations on governmental authority-such as par-
ticipatory rights at trial-that protect part of the natural executive 
right, while carefully delineating the reserved right's scope in order to 
avoid a descent into the chaos of the state of nature. 
One benefit of the fourth justification is that it can explain 
Scalia's claim that the scope of the Second Amendment is limited to 
arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses."179 Under the fourth justification, the scope of the right to 
bear arms depends upon symbolic considerations. In nations where 
arms possession is uncommon, simply retaining the capacity to use 
one's fists or a knife might be a sufficient expression of Lockean val-
ues. In the United States, however, guns take on an important expres-
sive role. But this expressive role would not be played by arms, like 
machine guns, that are not typically possessed. 
179 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. 
HeinOnline -- 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 189 2008-2009
2008] WHY PROTECT PRIVATE ARMS POSSESSION? t8g 
As a final matter, how might the fourth justification answer the 
important questions of incorporation and the appropriate standard of 
review? On the one hand, the analogy between the right to bear arms 
and participatory rights at trial might argue in favor of incorporation 
and a rigorous standard of review. My guess, however, is that since the 
scope of the Second Amendment would substantially depend upon 
symbolic considerations under the fourth justification, the arguments 
for a strict scrutiny standard of review or for incorporation would be 
weak. 
